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AARON BAKER*
Proportional, Not Strict, Scrutiny: Against a U.S.
"Suspect Classifications" Model under Article 14
ECHR in the U.K.
This article maintains that U.K courts, in applying Article 14 of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), should under no
circumstances emulate the U.S. Equal Protection Clause (EPC) ap-
proach to justifying state discrimination, and that to do so would fly
in the face of Strasbourg precedent and common sense. To support
these contentions this article first analyzes some illustrative U.K dis-
crimination cases to evaluate to what extent and why the United King-
dom appears to lean in the direction of a "suspect classifications"
approach to justification of discriminatory treatment. It then explains
how U.S. courts handle justification under the EPC, offering a critical
assessment of (1) the reasons for the evolution of that approach, and
(2) its coherence and success. The article then analyzes, by compari-
son, the approach of the European Court of Human Rights to Article
14 justification, noting the inconsistency of the Strasbourg teaching
with a U.S.-style methodology. The article concludes that the U.S.
model arises from a completely different jurisprudential tradition and
logic than the ECHR's proportionality model. The United Kingdom
should thus reject the U.S. practice of applying discrete levels of scru-
tiny depending on the degree to which a classification is "suspect."
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional or treaty provisions that guarantee equal treat-
ment at the hands of the state, such as the Equal Protection Clause
(EPC) of the U.S. Constitution and Article 14 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR), generally require, at some point,
that courts decide what kinds of unequal treatment are justified.
Law, and other acts of government, must obviously make distinctions
among people or "discriminate" in the strict sense of the word. When
Article 14 or the Equal Protection Clause promise equal treatment,
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they do not seek to proscribe, for example, differentiating between job
candidates on the basis of relevant qualifications or between taxpay-
ers on the basis of whether they are employed or self-employed. In-
stead, those equality provisions prohibit "unjustified" discrimination,
such as almost every distinction on the basis of race, and the vast
majority of distinctions on the basis of gender. Some might find the
phrases "almost every" and "vast majority" surprising, but of course
the state might legitimately use distinctions of race, for example in
affirmative or positive action,' and of gender, such as in the provision
of social services for battered women. 2 The fact that some distinctions
are allowed and others are not-and that distinguishing on some
grounds appears generally justified while on others very rarely justi-
fied-requires that the application of these broad equality guaran-
tees rely significantly on some kind of "justification" analysis.
The Equal Protection Clause and Article 14 both differ in an im-
portant way from typical statutory anti-discrimination laws. Statu-
tory prohibitions typically specify a regulated area to which they
apply, such as employment, or the provision of goods and services,
and identify clearly those situations in which the impugned ground of
discrimination may not receive any consideration, and under what
circumstances it may play a part in decisions. For example, in the
United Kingdom, the Race Relations Act 1976 essentially declares
that no employment decision may take race into account except
where the decision turns on a genuine occupational requirement. 3
The structure of the statute is one that seeks to shield courts from
decisions about when race discrimination is justified or not. The leg-
islature has already decided that race discrimination is always unjus-
tified in the employment context, except in specified and very narrow
circumstances.
By contrast, Article 14 ECHR does not impose a clear limit on
what grounds of discrimination it prohibits and leaves the question of
justification to a case-by-case determination. 4 In a similar vein, the
U.S. Equal Protection Clause appears completely open-ended with re-
gard to grounds of distinction, leaving the U.S. Supreme Court to de-
velop an elaborate system of differing levels of scrutiny for
determining the extent to which different kinds of discrimination are
justified.5 These open-textured equality guarantees appear to grant
courts the daunting and controversial power to distinguish between
legal differentiation and illegal discrimination. Deciding whether the
state may or may not discriminate on a given ground in a given cir-
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
2. (United Kingdom) Sex Discrimination Act 1975 sections 35(1), 46.
3. RRA 1976 sections 4A, 5.
4. R (S) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2004] UKHL 39, para. 48;
Belgian Linguistics (1968) 1 EHRR 252, para. 10.
5. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
[Vol. 56
PROPORTIONAL, NOT STRICT, SCRUTINY
cumstance ultimately involves a value judgment. When it enacts a
statute forbidding race discrimination in employment, the legislature
makes a value judgment to the effect that it is wrong to deprive a
person of employment opportunities on the basis of an irrelevant but
immutable human characteristic. In a slightly different way, a legis-
lature makes a value judgment when it enacts a law making a stu-
dent loan program available only to people under the age of fifty-five:
it has decided that the benefits of the program, for society as a whole,
outweigh the harm to those over fifty-five, or that the exclusion of
those over fifty-five does not deprive them of anything fundamental
to human dignity or to their participation in society. If a person over
fifty-five challenges this limit-it is clearly discrimination, if not nec-
essarily unjustified discrimination-under a constitutional equal
treatment guarantee, this seems to require the court to second-guess
the legislature's judgment.6
Some would assert that legislatures have a superior claim to le-
gitimacy in making these value judgments and thus courts should
limit their scrutiny to the question of whether the political process
has been undermined or whether the act of the legislature conflicts
with clear and entrenched principles. 7 These views sit at one extreme
of a continuum between judicial activism and judicial deference and
commentators on every part of that spectrum seek to resolve the
same problem: how, and to what extent, should judges arrive at an-
swers to disputes that turn on value judgments, without substituting
themselves for the legislature or abdicating their responsibility to
protect against abuses by the majority? How courts in the United
Kingdom should answer this question, in applying Article 14 ECHR
under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), forms the central focus of
this article.
Since the coming into force of the HRA in 2000, U.K. judges have
been struggling to come to terms with an Article 14 analysis that has
transformed judicial oversight of allegedly discriminatory state ac-
tion.8 The proportionality-based justification analysis called for
under Article 14 diverges markedly from the standards applied in ju-
6. See, e.g., Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd [20031 All ER 97 (HL), paras. 61-63.
7. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW 87 (1980); CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS
Do (2001).
8. The HRA makes the ECHR, including Article 14, directly enforceable in the
U.K. courts. The specific way in which it does this places a great deal of responsibility
on the courts to declare whether state action violates ECHR treaty obligations. See
generally Francesca KIug, The Human Rights Act-A "Third Way" or "Third Wave"
Bill of Rights, [20011 EUR. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 361; Ian Leigh, Taking Rights Propor-
tionately: Judicial Review, the Human Rights Act and Strasbourg, [2002] PUBLIC LAW
265, 282-86; Jeffrey Jowell, Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial
Review, [2000] PUBLIC LAW 671; Mark Elliott, The HRA 1998 and the Standard of
Substantive Review, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 301 (2001); PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(4th ed, 1999) 546, 556-57, 561.
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dicial review and statutory discrimination cases. In the last seven
years, several high-profile cases with significant political or social
ramifications have put the judiciary under pressure to come quickly
to terms with the process of making value judgments about discrimi-
nation. 9 Unfortunately, the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg (ECtHR) offers little in the way of step-by-step instruc-
tion in how to perform a justification inquiry. Owing to its role as a
supervisor of sovereign states party to an international treaty, the
ECtHR observes a "margin of appreciation," leaving national govern-
ments to decide how to resolve questions of justification. The Stras-
bourg court tells the Contracting Parties when they have exceeded
this margin, but does not illustrate the mechanics of performing a
proportionality balancing. 10 Therefore these formative years have
seen U.K. courts needing to fashion a justification doctrine on the fly,
where the functions they seem called upon to perform sit in tension
with the judicial review functions and statutory anti-discrimination
functions they have performed in the past.
These circumstances have produced a tendency toward paying
much more attention, in the justification inquiry, to evaluating the
benefits procured by a challenged measure than to its discriminatory
impact. U.K. courts incline, once they have identified some kind of
discriminatory impact, to shrink from fleshing out any specific extent
of the impact, preferring to place grounds of discrimination (e.g., sex,
race, religion) in categories requiring a greater or lesser weight, in
terms of advancement of legitimate aims, to counteract a standard-
ized discriminatory impact.11 The U.S. "suspect classifications" ap-
proach under the EPC illustrates this paradigm, in that it expressly
provides for graduated levels of scrutiny of government distinctions
depending on whether they turn on more or less "suspect" forms of
classification.' 2 The House of Lords (the U.K.'s court of last resort)
has recently spoken with approval of the suspect classification model,
without unequivocally adopting it as the orthodox U.K. justification
analysis. 13
This article maintains that U.K. courts should under no circum-
stances emulate the EPC approach to justification and that to do so
would fly in the face of Strasbourg precedent and common sense. To
9. See, e.g., A and Ors v. Home Secretary [2004] UKHL 56; Ghaidan v. Godin-
Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30; R (S) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2004]
UKHL 39.
10. But see Dudgeon v. United Kingdom [1981] 4 EHRR. 149, paras. 59-61, where
the Court demonstrates by example the kinds of considerations to be weighed in a
proportionality inquiry.
11. Board of Governors of St Matthias Church v. Crizzle, [1993] IRLR 472 at 475;
R (Carson) v. Secretary for Work and Pensions, [20051 UKHL 37, paras. 18-27; Al-
lonby v. Accrington and Rossendale College [2001] IRLR 364, 370.
12. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-46.
13. Carson, [20051 UKHL 37 at paras. 55-57.
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support these contentions, this article first, in Section II, analyzes
some illustrative U.K. discrimination cases to evaluate to what ex-
tent and why the United Kingdom appears to lean in the direction of
a "suspect classification" approach. Section III explains how U.S.
courts handle justification under the EPC, offering a critical assess-
ment of (1) the reasons for the evolution of that approach, and (2) its
coherence and success. Section IV then analyzes, by comparison, the
approach of the ECtHR to Article 14 justification, noting the inconsis-
tency of the Strasbourg teaching with a U.S.-style methodology. The
article concludes that the U.S. model arises from a completely differ-
ent jurisprudential tradition and logic than the ECHR's proportional-
ity model and the United Kingdom should thus reject the U.S.
practice of applying discrete levels of scrutiny depending on the de-
gree to which a classification is "suspect."
II. THE U.K. JUDICIARY AND JUSTIFICATION
The judiciary of the United Kingdom handles justification like an
opera director handles a fading star soprano whose voice might crack
at any moment. The star must go on stage or the seats will be empty,
but all of the challenging bits are flattened out and masked by the
orchestra. "Challenging bits" in this simile (which hereafter we will
leave in peace) refers to the principle of proportionality. Proportional-
ity is a concept that has been well developed in Europe, but incorpo-
rated in U.K. adjudication only grudgingly, and often because
European obligations required it. 14 It has been formulated in a vari-
ety of ways, not only in different jurisdictions but within jurisdic-
tions, but it essentially requires, in its simplest sense, that the costs
of applying a challenged distinction or rule do not outweigh the bene-
fits to the public interest. 15 In the human rights and discrimination
context, it functions as a kind of "sliding scale" scrutiny that applies
to measures that prima facie discriminate, or invade a right.16 As
such it operates as a defense and effectively places the burden on the
state to prove that the balance vindicates the impugned act. How-
ever, by its nature it adapts on a case-by-case basis, calling for
greater benefits to be shown by measures that impose substantial
burdens and fairly minimal justifications for negligible burdens. It is
in the performance of this balancing, and especially in the assess-
14. R (Daly) v. Home Secretary [2001] UKHL 26, paras. 26, 27, 32; R (Brind) v.
Home Secretary [1991] 1 AC 696, 766-767; MURRAY HUNT, USING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
IN ENGLISH COURTS (1998).
15. Belgian Linguistics (1968) 1 EHRR 252, para. 10; A and Ors v. Home Secre-
tary [2004] UKHL 56, para. 50; Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, para.
133; Lord Hoffmann, The Influence of the European Principle of Proportionality upon
U.K. Law, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE (Evelyn
Ellis ed., 1999), 107 (Lord Hoffmann is a Law Lord in the U.K. House of Lords).
16. DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
146 (2002).
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ment of the burden side of the equation, that U.K. judges have come
up short.
A. Justification in Indirect Discrimination Cases
Although the British courts flirted with proportionality in their
judicial review jurisprudence, 17 the primary role of proportionality
outside the ECHR and the HRA has been in areas heavily influenced
by European Community law such as indirect discrimination.18 Indi-
rect discrimination involves a claim, for example under the Race Re-
lations Act 1976, that a facially neutral rule has a disproportionate
impact on persons of the claimant's race (in the United States this is
called "disparate impact" discrimination).19 The proportionality
under discussion here has nothing to do with measuring "dispropor-
tionate impact," which is generally done with statistics. 20 Proportion-
ality comes into play because the Race Relations Act 1976 and similar
statutes allow defendants to "justify" indirect discrimination by way
of a form of proportionality defense. Good illustrations, both of the
formulation of this defense and of a U.K. court dancing around pro-
portionality, come from Board of Governors of St Matthias Church v.
Crizzle, where the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Wood, J.) found in-
direct discrimination against an applicant for a head teacher position
justified on the facts. 21
The school had advertised a head teacher post with the require-
ment that the applicant be a "communicant" in the Church of En-
gland or the Catholic Church, so that he or she could lead the
morning assemblies in prayer. The claimant, an Asian woman who
was not a communicant but was otherwise a well-qualified member of
the Church of England, demonstrated that a much smaller propor-
tion of Asians could satisfy the communicant requirement than could
whites. The Employment Appeal Tribunal set out the following test,
the satisfaction of which would allow the school to justify the indirect
discrimination:
(a) Was the objective of the governors a legitimate objective
(it is not for the Industrial Tribunal to redraft or redefine the
objective)? In the present case it was to have a head teacher
who could lead the school in spiritual worship and in partic-
ular the administering of the sacrament at the weekly mass
to those who were confirmed. The head teacher should have
17. R (Pegasus Holdings (London) Ltd) v. Transport Secretary [1988] 1 WLR 990.
18. Allonby v. Accrington and Rossendale College [20011 IRLR 364, paras. 23-29;
Evelyn Ellis, Proportionality in European Community Sex Discrimination Law, in
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE (Evelyn Ellis ed.,1999),
170-72.
19. RRA 1976 section (1A).
20. Jones v. University of Manchester [1993] IRLR 218.
21. [1993] IRLR 472 at 475.
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full membership of the Church in order to foster the Anglo-
Catholic ethos of the school.
(b) Were the means used to achieve the objective reasonable
in themselves? and;
(c) When balanced on the principles of proportionality be-
tween the discriminatory effect upon the applicant's racial
group and the reasonable needs of the governors, were they
justified?22
The opinion then carefully explained the school's objective, in-
cluding a discussion of why it was appropriate to describe the objec-
tive in such a way that the objective differed in no meaningful way
from the means adopted to meet it. This discussion was in response to
the finding by the tribunal below that the "legitimate objective"
should have been that of blending an "Anglo-Catholic ethos" with effi-
cient education and that therefore the means (requiring a communi-
cant head teacher) was not reasonable. 23 The Employment Appeal
Tribunal's entire justification analysis centered, like that of the tribu-
nal before it, on assessing the legitimacy of the school's aims and the
extent to which the rule in question suited those aims. Leaving aside
the questionable lucidity of both analyses, not a word was written by
either tribunal on the subject of the impact of the discrimination on
the claimant, or upon the local Asian community, or upon relations
between whites and Asians in the local community. In other words,
the tribunals treated the "discriminatory effect" from element (c) as if
it had an assumed weight. The Employment Appeal Tribunal opinion
left the impression that although indirect discrimination was bad,
the weight of its badness could never be great enough to outweigh a
legitimate objective, reasonably pursued.
Indirect discrimination cases throughout the 1980s and 1990s
frequently employed this approach. Discriminatory effect would be
mentioned as an element but not really weighed, 24 or weighed in an
improperly restrictive way.25 The Court of Appeal finally pointed out
this failing to the lower courts and tribunals in 2001, after the HRA
had elevated the importance of proportionality to the judiciary:
Once a finding of a condition having a disparate and adverse
impact on women had been made, what was required was at
the minimum a critical evaluation of whether the [em-
ployer's] reasons demonstrated a real need to dismiss the ap-
22. Id.
23. Id. at 476.
24. Barry v. Midland Bank plc [1998] 1 All ER 805; Brook & Others v. London
Borough of Haringey [1992] IRLR 478; Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority and
another [1991] IRLR 44.
25. Barry v. Midland Bank plc [1999] 3 All ER 974 (HL) (by Lord Nicholls).
2008] 853
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plicant; if there was such a need, consideration of the
seriousness of the disparate impact of the dismissal on wo-
men including the applicant; and an evaluation of whether
the former were sufficient to outweigh the latter.26
Despite this admonition, it remains hard to find cases where a
tribunal actually attempts to give a weight to the effects of indirect
discrimination,27 and appellate courts are much more insistent on
careful weighing when exhorting the troops than when applying pro-
portionality themselves. 28
One obvious reason why judges shy away from weighing impacts
and balancing them against an employer's interests (or the public in-
terest, as the case may be) is an understandable hesitancy, born of
judicial restraint in the judicial review context, to substitute their
judgment for that of the decision-maker. An additional reason for
suppressing the impact side of the analysis arises from the fact that
anti-discrimination statutes in the United Kingdom focus almost en-
tirely on the conduct of the alleged "discriminator." For arguably de-
fensible reasons, a critique of which falls outside the scope of this
paper, the Race Relations Act 1976, and similar statutes generally
treat discrimination as a thing that is done, not as a thing that hap-
pens to people. The questions they ask are not so much about the
experience of the claimant, but about the actions of the employer (or
provider of goods or services, etc.). Indirect discrimination claims-
always a minority as compared with direct discrimination-offer one
exception to this rule, but I suggest that this exception makes judges
uncomfortable. For them, the question in these tort-like cases is
whether the defendant committed the wrong or not.29 When it comes
to damages the claimant's experiences come into play, but it does not
mesh well with the statutory discrimination paradigm to allow the
"guilt" or "innocence" of the defendant to turn on the effects of the
discrimination on the person or group of people affected.
B. Justification under Article 14
Article 14, by contrast, does not initially focus on the actions of
the state but on the effects of those actions on the claimant or the
26. Allonby v. Accrington and Rossendale College [2001] IRLR 364, 370.
27. In Ms J Mitchell v. David Evans Agricultural Ltd 2006 WL 1078886 EAT,
paras. 7-17, the EAT was forced once again to reverse a decision of a tribunal that
failed altogether to mention impacts or the need to consider them; in Hardy & Han-
sons Plc v. Lax [2005] EWCA Civ 846 CA (Civ Div), paras. 35-49, the Court of Appeal
carefully critiqued and approved a tribunal decision, in favor of the employee, that
rested exclusively on the reasons given by the employer, without reference to the ef-
fects of the discrimination; in Mrs. A Azmi v. Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council
2007 WL 1058367 EAT, paras. 58-74, the EAT cited Lax while performing a justifica-
tion analysis involving no consideration of impacts whatsoever.
28. Huang v. Home Secretary [20071 UKHL 11, para. 19.
29. RRA 1976 section 1.
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group to which he or she belongs.30 Article 14 of the Council of Eu-
rope's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms reads as follows:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.
Strasbourg has placed only two relevant glosses on this appar-
ently straightforward guarantee. The first is that Article 14 applies
only where the facts of the case fall within the "ambit" of other Con-
vention rights, where the "ambit" is shorthand for an area in which
the enjoyment of the relevant right is rendered unequal by the chal-
lenged measure. 31 The second is that a distinction on the basis of a
"status" covered by Article 14 does not amount to discrimination in
violation of the article if it is justified:
A difference of treatment in the exercise of a right laid down
in the Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim;
Article 14 is likewise violated when it is clearly established
that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realized.32
It has subsequently been made clear that this renders impermis-
sible a regulatory distinction that produces "harms to other legiti-
mate interests" disproportionate to the advancement of a legitimate
aim secured by the measure. 33 Thus, a finding of prima facie discrim-
ination turns exclusively on whether state action had the effect of
unequally burdening the claimant's enjoyment of a right on a covered
ground. The intentions of the government come into play only in jus-
tification and only as balanced against the harms to the claimant or
to society.
It is important in this regard to distinguish clearly between the
state's motive or intention on one hand, and what basis for distinc-
tion the state actually uses on the other. The state might, for exam-
ple, be motivated to adopt a certain rule because of differences in the
cost of living but then manifest that intention through the proxy of
residence: cost of living is the motive, but residence is the ground of
30. Thlimmenos v. Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 411, paras. 39-42.
31. Aaron Baker, The Enjoyment of Rights and Freedoms: a New Conception of the
'Ambit' under Article 14 ECHR, 69(5) MODERN L. REV. 714, 718-25 (2006).
32. (1968) 1 EHRR 252, para. 10.
33. A and Ors v. Home Secretary [2004] UKHL 56, para. 50; Ghaidan v. Godin-
Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, paras. 19-20; National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium
1 EHRR. 578, para. 49 (1975).
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distinction. A good example of the line between motive and ground
occurs in Abdulaziz v. U.K,34 in which the ECtHR upheld an Article
14 claim on the ground of sex but rejected one on the ground of race.
The race claim was denied because, although the challenged immi-
gration measure clearly caused a disproportionate impact on one ra-
cial group over another, it did not use race as a basis for
differentiation but instead relied on immigration status.35 Although
the Court noted an absence of discriminatory motive, the holding
turned on the facts that (a) the measure did not use any racial char-
acteristic as a ground of distinction and (b) immigration measures
will by their nature have differential impacts along racial lines.36
Meanwhile, the Court held that sex discrimination had taken place
because, despite the government's demonstration of gender neutral
reasons for its actions, "it was not disputed that under the 1980 Rules
it was easier for a man settled in the United Kingdom than for a wo-
man so settled to obtain permission for his or her non-national spouse
to enter or remain in the country for settlement."37 In short, if the
treatment differed on the relevant ground (gender), then the neutral
immigration-related motive made no difference; nor did the motive
make a difference where the ground of distinction was not the ground
complained of (race).
Recent Strasbourg judgments have made it even clearer that a
finding of discrimination does not rely on the presence of a discrimi-
natory motive. Article 14 discrimination can also be established on an
indirect or disparate impact theory. In Thlimmenos v. Greece, the
Court found discriminatory the state's failure to treat differently a
conviction for conscientious objection to military service-on the
ground of religion-in applying a rule prohibiting those with "serious
convictions" from receiving appointment as an accountant.38 In D. H.
and Others v. Czech Republic the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held
expressly that a race-neutral policy, shown by statistics to impose an
unequal burden on an ethnic group, constituted a prima facie case of
Article 14 discrimination. 39 The D.H. opinion made explicit what a
substantial body of earlier case law had implied: discriminatory im-
pacts establish the existence, or not, of discrimination; motive can
play a part only in justification. 40
34. 94 (1985) EHRR 471.
35. Id. at para. 85.
36. Id. at paras. 84-85.
37. Id. at paras. 74-80.
38. Thlimmenos v. Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 411, paras. 39-42.
39. D. H. and Others v. Czech Republic [2007] ECHR 57325/00.
40. Thlimmenos (2001) 31 EHRR 411, paras. 39-42; Abdulaziz 94 (1985) EHRR
471, paras. 74-80; Paulik v. lovakia [2006] ECHR 10699/05, paras. 54-58 (Court recog-
nized that the state's motive was to maintain legal certainty but found discrimination
on the basis that adjudicated fathers experienced obstacles not faced by presumed
fathers) (discussed more fully below at infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text);
856 [Vol. 56
PROPORTIONAL, NOT STRICT, SCRUTINY
Under the HRA in the United Kingdom, then, the state can incur
Article 14 liability purely as a result of the unforeseen impact of a
challenged measure regardless of the intentions behind it.41 This au-
thorization to focus on effects has not in practice, however, left U.K.
judges any more comfortable with weighing impacts in post-HRA Ar-
ticle 14 cases. U.K. courts seem determined to apply the state's inten-
tions and reasons to dispose of a case before being required to
attribute prima facie discrimination to the government. A look at the
decisions at the trial, appeal, and House of Lords levels in the case of
R (Carson) v. Secretary for Work and Pensions42 provides a classic
example of courts not only ignoring the impact side of the justifica-
tion analysis, but bending over backward to avoid the justification
inquiry altogether.
C. The Carson Case
The Carson case began in the Administrative Court and was de-
cided in the Court of Appeal together with R (Reynolds) v. Secretary
for Work and Pensions; both cases were ultimately heard in the
House of Lords. 43 Mrs. Carson, a U.K. citizen who had retired to
South Africa, complained that the state discriminated against her by
failing to increase her pension each year by the same amount that it
increased the pensions of U.K. residents, and of residents of some
other countries like the United States. 44 The Secretary for Work and
Pensions defended the policy on the ground that the uprate in pen-
sion was intended to ameliorate the effects of inflation in the United
Kingdom, not just on the pensioners themselves but on the U.K. econ-
omy as a whole, and that therefore the reasons for the expenditure of
public funds represented by the uprate did not apply to other coun-
tries.45 The few foreign countries where the uprate did apply had ne-
gotiated pension reciprocity treaties with the United Kingdom, so
concerns of foreign policy made the uprate expenditures necessary for
Evans v. UK [20061 ECHR 6339/05 (no unlawful discrimination was found but the
Court assumed the state's motive was administrative manageability and legal cer-
tainty, and based its holding on the conclusion that the differential impact on women
was not sufficiently strong to outweigh the state's justification).
41. Aaron Baker, Comparison Tainted by Justification: Against a "Compendious
Question" in Article 14 Discrimination, (2006) PUBLIC LAW 475, 483-85 (hereinafter
Comparison); Ian Leigh, Taking Rights Proportionately: Judicial Review, the Human
Rights Act and Strasbourg, PUBLIc LAW 265, 282-86 (2002); Jeffrey Jowell, Beyond the
Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review, PUBLIC LAw 671 (2001); Mark
Elliott, The HRA 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
301 (2001); PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATWVE LAw 546, 556-57 (4th ed., 1999).
42. [2005] UKHL 37.
43. Id.; [2002] 3 All E.R. 994 (Admin); [2003] E.W.C.A. Civ 797 (CA).
44. [2002] 3 All E.R. 994, paras. 2-7, 61-65; [2003] E.W.C.A. Civ 797, paras. 9-10,
62-64; [2005] UKHL 37, paras. 5-7, 18-27.
45. Id.
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pensioners in those countries. 46 In short, the state pursued its inter-
est in not spending its funds unnecessarily by denying the uprate to
pensioners where economic or foreign policy reasons for the uprate
did not apply and Carson claimed this constituted discrimination on
the ground of her place of residence.
Judges at all three levels of Carson got the Article 14 analysis
badly wrong. That is not to say that they reached the wrong result.
On the contrary, the decision to distinguish on the basis of resi-
dence-or to put it in Equal Protection Clause parlance, to "classify"
on the basis of residence-probably satisfies a properly applied Arti-
cle 14 analysis. 47 The problem is that Carson, a key House of Lords
precedent, did not employ a correct Article 14 analysis. Section IV of
this article will provide more detail on what this should look like.
That section (1) rejects the suggestion in Carson that the Strasbourg
teaching on Article 14 resembles the U.S. "suspect classifications"
model, and (2) demonstrates that the modern ECtHR approach to
proportionality conflicts directly with that taken in Carson. For the
present purpose of evaluating the Carson decision, however, a crude
sketch of the elements of an Article 14 claim will suffice.
First, the claimant must establish that the discrimination of
which she complains involves her enjoyment of the rights and free-
doms guaranteed to her under the Convention. 48 In Carson, the
courts at each level agreed that the distinction affected the claimant's
enjoyment of her possessions under Article 1 of Protocol 1. 49 Second,
the claimant must show that she suffered different treatment than
chosen comparators on a ground covered by Article 14.50 Burnton, J.,
in the Administrative Court, treated the "ground covered by Article
14" issue as a separate question but each court agreed that place of
residence qualified. Third, in cases where any doubt exists as to the
true basis for the challenged classification, the claimant must show
that her situation is "analogous" to that of the chosen comparators, in
every respect relevant to the challenged decision other than the al-
leged ground of distinction, in order to demonstrate that the im-
pugned ground was in fact the basis of the distinction. 51 In Carson,
the parties agreed that Mrs. Carson had been denied the pension
uprate exclusively because of her place of residence, and not, for ex-
46. Id.
47. But see Carson [2005] UKHL 37, paras. 92-104 (Lord Carswell, dissenting,
found the discrimination disproportionate and a violation of Article 14, owing to the
overbreadth of the rule in denying the uprate to pensioners where local conditions did
not reflect the rate of inflation).
48. Gaygusuz v. Austria (1996) 23 EHRR 365, paras. 36-41.
49. [20021 3 All E.R. 994, para. 53; [2003] EWCA. Civ 797, paras. 32-41; [2005]
UKHL 37, paras. 11-12.
50. Petrovich v. Austria (1998) 33 E.H.R.R. 307.
51. Gaygusuz, (1996) 23 EHRR 365, paras. 42-50; Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank
[2002] Ch 51 (reversed on unrelated grounds [2003] UKHL. 37).
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ample, because of any information she provided about the cost of liv-
ing in South Africa. If (1) the parties do not dispute the ground of
distinction, and (2) the ground of distinction is one covered by Article
14, then there is nothing left for the court to do but proceed to the
final question of whether the state can demonstrate that its discrimi-
natory treatment is justified.5 2 A distinction on a ground covered by
Article 14 that affects the equal enjoyment of one or more Convention
rights or freedoms is prima facie discriminatory. However, the state
may prove that its classification does not amount to discrimination in
violation of Article 14 by showing that the classification (1) pursues a
legitimate objective, (2) employs a means reasonably suited to ad-
vancing that objective, and (3) does not impose burdens on rights in-
terests disproportionate to the extent to which it advances the
legitimate state objective. 53
1. The Lower Courts in Carson
The Administrative Court and the Court of Appeal badly bungled
the analysis by applying the third question (analogous comparators)
where it served no purpose and then treating it as an opportunity for
the state to justify its classification without needing to satisfy propor-
tionality. 54 Judges in both courts found that differences in cost of liv-
ing between the United Kingdom and South Africa in effect rendered
the impugned distinction prima facie non-discriminatory: people in
one country could not serve as analogous comparators for people in
another because the economic circumstances in each country dif-
fered.55 Although this article does not focus on the analogous compa-
rator issue, it requires discussion here because of its interrelation
with justification.56 An understanding of how erroneously and unnec-
essarily the Carson courts used the comparator issue to avoid appear-
ing to require a justification from the state shows just how
uncomfortable the judges were with the kind of inquiry required by
Article 14 under the HRA.
Once it has been decided that a challenged distinction (1) affects
the equal enjoyment of convention rights, and (2) amounts to a differ-
ence in treatment on a ground covered by Article 14, what could be
left to analyze other than whether the distinction is justified? The
classic role of the analogous comparators question is to separate, for
example, discrimination based on sex from distinct treatment based
52. Comparison, supra note 41, generally; FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 142-45.
53. Belgian Linguistics (1968) 1 EHRR 252, para. 10; National Union of Belgian
Police v. Belgium 1 E.H.R.R. 578, para. 49 (1975); A and Ors v. Home Secretary [2004]
UKHL 56, para. 50; Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, paras. 19-20.
54. Carson, [2002] 3 All ER 994, paras. 61-67; [2003] EWCA Civ 797, paras. 61-
63.
55. Id.
56. Baker, supra note 31, generally; Carson [2003] EWCA Civ 797, para. 64.
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on a difference in qualifications. If a woman claiming discriminatory
denial of promotion compared herself to a man who got the promo-
tion, a court would properly ascertain whether, with respect to cir-
cumstances relevant to the promotion decision, she was analogous to
the man in every respect other than sex. It would be absurd to claim
that the two were not analogous comparators because they lived in
different neighborhoods, if that had no legitimate bearing on promo-
tion decisions. It would be just as absurd to claim they were not ap-
propriate comparators because women, statistically, tend to take
more time off for family reasons than men do. This might be true, and
it might even be relevant in the employer's mind to the decision about
whom to promote and in whom to invest time and training. However,
it cannot mean that the comparators are not analogous because (1) it
is an implication of the very ground of discrimination whose legiti-
macy is under challenge, and (2) the employer did not actually use
"likelihood to take time off of work for family reasons" as a criterion
for promotion and did not collect non-gender-dependent information
about whether this man or this woman were more likely to take time
off. In other words, where the parties dispute the actual ground of
distinction (e.g., gender or qualifications), the comparators must
share all of the attributes properly taken into account and assessed in
making the decision, with the exception of the allegedly illegitimate
ground and any characteristics for which that ground was used as a
proxy.
Neither party in Carson disputed the fact that the cost of living
in South Africa had never been a factor in processing Carson's pen-
sion claim. Indeed, no evidence of cost of living or any economic differ-
ences between South Africa and the United Kingdom were received
by the Administrative Court;5 7 there was never any challenge at any
stage of the proceedings to the fact that Carson was refused the rele-
vant pension increases solely on the ground that she resided in South
Africa. This meant that the most obvious product of a comparison-
isolation of the true ground of discrimination-was well established.
If one imagines a "decision-maker" at the Department of Work and
Pensions preparing to rule on Mrs. Carson's case, and on that of a
U.K. pensioner with the same contribution record (i.e., a history of
paying contributions based on wages in the United Kingdom) but liv-
ing in the United Kingdom, that decision-maker would have only the
contribution records and the places of residence on which to base the
decision. No information on relative costs of living would come into
the decision; it would not even be available. Therefore, at least in the
eyes of this notional decision-maker, the cases to be determined
would be not only "relevantly analogous" but completely identical ex-
cept for one factor: the place of residence. It is clear then that purely
57. Carson, [2002] 3 All ER 994, para. 62.
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on the basis of the correct model for the analogous comparator in-
quiry, the Carson courts erred by factoring cost of living into the com-
parison. The error is made more arresting, however, by the fact that
the correct next step in the analysis, justification, was the obvious
vehicle for taking account of differences in cost of living and the eco-
nomic purposes of pension schemes. Instead, the courts used the very
information, which they could properly have relied on in justification
incorporating proportionality, to dispose of the prima facie case
through a meaningless step that did not involve a proportionality
balancing.
Almost, it seems, in recognition of this anomaly, both Burnton,
J., in the Administrative Court, and Laws, L.J., in the Court of Ap-
peal, went on to discuss justification, in case they had been wrong on
the prima facie case.5 8 Unsurprisingly, neither court made an effort
to assess the impact of the resident/non-resident distinction on Mrs.
Carson, other non-resident pensioners, or on, for example, the liberty
interest in freedom of movement.59 The justification analysis in both
decisions turned exclusively on the state's prerogative to make the
decision in question. Burnton, J. opined that the challenged policy
involved two state interests that fell especially outside the province of
judiciary: resource allocation and foreign relations. 60 He saw the
claimant as asking the court to interfere where it had no expertise or
authority and where the Secretary had chosen a means that he could
rationally believe would advance a legitimate aim. In essence,
Burnton, J. applied what Americans call "rational basis" review by
using deference as an excuse not to perform a proportionality
balancing.
Laws, L.J., at the Court of Appeal, preferred not to depend on the
word "deference" and eschewed ring-fencing entire subjects from re-
view, but nevertheless rested his decision on "an area of discretionary
judgment" reserved for the executive and a prudential requirement
that courts restrain themselves from interfering with that discre-
tion.61 He reasoned that good management of funds constituted a le-
gitimate aim and that denying the uprate to non-U.K. pensioners in
non-reciprocal countries numbered among the reasonable options the
Secretary might choose for achieving it. However, he never men-
tioned either necessity or proportionality, summing up his conclusion
in this way:
Addressing the case in the light of all these matters, I con-
clude that there is no consideration which remotely consti-
58. Carson, [2002] 3 All ER 994, paras. 67-75; [2003] EWCA Civ 797, paras. 65-
74.
59. Id.
60. Carson, [2002] 3 All ER 994, paras. 68-70.
61. Carson, [2003] EWCA Civ 797, paras. 68-74.
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tutes so powerful a legal imperative as to deny the
justifications I have discussed for the government's refusal
to uprate the pensions of Ms Carson and those in like case.6 2
Lord Justice Laws might claim, if challenged, that the foregoing
implies a proportionality balancing resolved in favor of the state.
However, in light of the clear failure of the trial court below even to
imply proportionality or necessity, the Court of Appeal at best au-
thorized a cavalier, one-sided approach to proportionality. Worse, by
agonizing over the issues of deference, discretion, and the legitimacy
of the state's aim, the opinion appropriates, to the ideas of deference
and restraint, a power to obviate proportionality. This power simply
does not exist and finds no support in ECtHR jurisprudence. It is one
thing for a court to defer to or refuse to interfere with decisions about
(1) what aims to pursue, (2) to what extent to seek to realize those
aims, and even, to a lesser extent, (3) the best ways to pursue those
aims.63 It is quite another to conclude that having deferred legitimate
aim and reasonable means in favor of the state, a court may simply
skip the last element of the test and fail even to ask whether the
effects of the challenged classification might outweigh the amount of
public benefit achieved through the chosen means.
2. Carson in the House of Lords
The House of Lords in Carson appeared to understand that the
use of the analogous comparator inquiry to do the work of justifica-
tion could not withstand careful scrutiny. However, the Lords offered
a cure worse than the disease: if the alleged classification is not "sus-
pect," in that it does not implicate "equal respect," then the court
need only ask the question asked by the lower courts in Carson: does
the measure in question constitute a reasonable means of pursuing a
legitimate state objective? Lord Hoffmann, in a leading speech for the
majority, advised lower courts not to follow the, until then, popular
step-by-step Article 14 analysis set out in Wandsworth London Bor-
ough Council v. Michalak,64 which differentiated the analogous com-
parator step and the justification step:
I have found it better not to use the Michalak framework.
What matters in my opinion is that (1) there is no question
in this case of discrimination on a ground such as race or
gender which denies Ms. Carson the right to equal respect,
(2) in applying a scheme of social security, it is rational and
internationally acceptable to distinguish between inhabi-
62. Id. at para. 74.
63. Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review 65(1) CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 174, 195-201 (2006).
64. [20021 EWCA Civ 271.
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tants of the United Kingdom and persons resident abroad,
and (3) the extent to which the claims, if any, of persons resi-
dent abroad should be recognized is a matter for parliamen-
tary decision. 65
In other words, instead of setting the lower courts straight about the
comparator inquiry, the Lords simply conjured away any require-
ment of proportionality in cases not implicating equal respect.
Lord Hoffmann's approach appears calculated to avoid a finding
of prima facie discrimination in all but the most irrational non-sus-
pect Article 14 cases. In cases not involving an "equal respect"
ground, the court must first ask whether there are relevant differ-
ences between the comparators: not "relevant" in the proper analo-
gous comparator sense of "factors taken into account in the
challenged decision" but in the sense of "relevant to the state's deci-
sion to treat the comparators differently." If such differences exist
then, for Lord Hoffmann, a court can exercise no constraint whatever
on the freedom of the other branches to treat the two sets of people
differently:
Once it is accepted that the position of Ms Carson is rele-
vantly different from that of a U.K. resident and that she
therefore cannot claim equality of treatment, the amount (if
any) which she receives must be a matter for Parliament. It
must be possible to recognize that her past contributions
gave her a claim in equity to some pension without having to
abandon the reasons why she cannot claim to be treated
equally.66
This position was approved of by Lords Walker, Rodger, and
Nichols, and the only dissenting voice was Lord Carswell. All of the
majority fell for the bizarre idea that there is some independent role
for an inquiry: (1) whose purpose is not to discover the actual ground
of distinction employed, (2) that considers all of the reasons the state
might have for wanting to effectuate a difference in treatment, and
(3) that nevertheless is not actually a justification incorporating pro-
portionality. If this inquiry yields "relevant" differences between peo-
ple, they may be treated as differently as the state chooses, using
whatever proxy for the relevant difference it chooses, so long as it does
not choose a proxy that has already been found to impinge on notions
of equal respect and dignity.
Lord Walker, additionally, offered an extensive speech to the ef-
fect that (1) even though Strasbourg has not clearly adopted a U.S.-
style suspect classifications approach,67 and (2) even though Article
65. Carson, [20051 UKHL 37, para. 33.
66. Id. at para. 25.
67. Id. at paras. 55-57.
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14 cases before the ECtHR almost always turn on justification (in-
deed, he could point to only two examples where the Strasbourg court
rejected a case on comparator grounds),68 the United Kingdom would
nevertheless follow the U.S. example on suspect classifications, and
treat all non-suspect classifications as requiring no more than a ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate aim to pass muster. Neither Lord
Walker's nor any majority speech at any point suggested that this
test would incorporate proportionality.
3. The Carson Rule is Wrong
The majority reasoning relied heavily on the idea that if people
differ in ways relevant to a legitimate state objective, the state may
differentiate between them in whatever way it wants. Although this
sounds attractive, in an authoritarian kind of way, the implications
warrant further scrutiny. Consider this hypothetical. A court is un-
likely to hold that "obesity," looked at in the abstract, is a suspect
classification implicating equal respect or dignity. Medical practition-
ers use the term without prejudice to connote a particularly excessive
level of body fat; society does not generally recognize a history of in-
vidious discrimination on the ground of "obesity." Obesity is in quotes
because the law provides no settled definition of what constitutes
obesity. Medical people have fairly arbitrary weight-to-height charts
that establish a threshold at which they will call a person obese but
these charts do not generally employ any diagnostic tools such as a
body fat analysis. Against this background, imagine that the govern-
ment sought to reduce health care costs by limiting to three the num-
ber of visits obese people could make to a general practitioner (GP)
each year under the National Health Service (NHS). To this end, Par-
liament adopts a weight-height chart commonly used in the NHS as
the basis for distinguishing between the obese and the non-obese.
When an "obese" claimant challenges the rule under Article 14, the
state defends itself on the ground that studies show that obesity
leads to health complications and that, on average, non-obese people
visit their GP three times a year while those who qualify as obese
tend to make far more visits, making obese people relevantly differ-
ent from non-obese people. The government believes that limiting ac-
cess of the obese to publicly-financed healthcare effects a fair
allocation of limited healthcare funds.69
68. Id. at paras. 65-68.
69. If this appears fanciful, consider that Parliament has recently outlawed hunt-
ing with a dog and a horse, but not with just a dog or just a horse. Legislatures rou-
tinely fashion crude distinctions to attack the bte noir of the day (in the
aforementioned example, foxhunting), and if the public became sufficiently frustrated
by long waiting lists clogged by people with what the tabloid press would call "self-
inflicted" medical conditions, an assault of some kind on the rights of the obese would
not strain the imagination.
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Assuming for the sake of discussion 70 that a classification on the
basis of weight-to-height ratio in the provision of essential healthcare
comes within the ambit either of the right to life or the right to pri-
vacy, there is little question that obesity or, strictly speaking, weight-
to-height ratio, would qualify as "some other status" under Article 14.
However, the Carson approach would have a court declaring that peo-
ple with a weight-to-height ratio above the cut-off differ, as a matter
of relevant fact, from people below the cut-off, in that people over the
cut-off tend to have greater health complications and make more doc-
tor visits (remember that the state in Carson offered no more than
broad claims that inflation in the United Kingdom exceeds that of
other countries). The claimant and any below-the-cut-off comparators
would therefore not occupy analogous circumstances and could be
treated in any different way that the state chose. Under the Carson
rule a Court could not examine this any further than to say that dis-
tinctions on the basis of weight are not suspect, that conserving funds
is a legitimate objective, and that it is up to Parliament and the Exec-
utive to decide how differently to treat relevantly different people.
Meanwhile, a proper Article 14 analysis would have subjected
the distinction on the ground of weight to a proportionality inquiry
and found that there existed many less restrictive means of saving
health care funds, in that the arbitrary weigh-to-height charts in-
clude a great many heavy people with no serious health problems and
exclude many lighter people with extensive healthcare problems
brought on by lifestyle. In light of that, a court should conclude that
the severity of the discriminatory impact, including the stigma the
measure placed on a particular class of people, possible indirectly dis-
criminatory effects on the basis of gender, race, or age, and negative
impacts on public health, the market for health care, and the econ-
omy generally, outweighed the benefits to the state of choosing this
particular distinction as a means of saving money. The implication of
the analysis would be that, as it applied in some cases, the weight-to-
height ratio distinction did in fact deny equal respect because it
forced on one or more people a diminished right to health care for
reasons that did not actually apply to them, simply because of gener-
alizations made about people like them.
As is discussed more fully in sections III and IV below, deciding
whether a classification is "suspect" involves balancing interests of
individuals or groups against those of the larger society. Proportion-
ality does that balancing on a case-by-case basis, making it possible
to discover that discrimination on grounds not generally associated
with invidious discrimination might be invidious in certain circum-
70. It does not matter whether this is a safe assumption because the point here is
to illustrate the kind of distinction-making that might satisfy the Carson standard,
not to explore whether obesity distinctions would attract Article 14 protection.
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stances (remember that discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or
sexual orientation was "common sense" at some time in the past). A
suspect classification model requires that society grow to full ac-
knowledgment of the general impropriety of distinguishing on a given
ground before a court may subject distinctions on that ground to the
kind of scrutiny that might discover discrete examples of improper
distinction. By requiring proportionality in each case, Article 14
avoids this "catch 22."
The obesity hypothetical illustrates how leaving proportionality
out of the equation forces a court to accept any plausible explanation
for differential treatment, regardless of how damaging it is to the
non-discrimination principle underlying Article 14 and regardless of
how avoidable that damage might have been. This constraint on scru-
tiny might be appropriate under traditional Wednesbury7' judicial re-
view, but it has no place in applying a human rights guarantee
intended to secure the equal enjoyment of specified human rights.
The hypothetical also shows that the Carson rule fails to subject to
scrutiny the choice of a particular ground of distinction like weight-
to-height ratio, as opposed to, for example, the underlying ground of
suffering from allegedly self-inflicted health conditions or making ex-
cessive use of the NHS. As long as some relevant difference can be
attributed to the two comparators, in this case the likelihood of their
developing obesity-related illnesses and making more doctor visits,
then the state never needs to justify its use of a particular proxy for
that underlying distinction, in this case a specific cut-off point on a
crude weight-to-height chart.
There will remain those who see no fundamental problem with
the Carson rule. A colorable argument can be made to the effect that
an equality provision might properly seek only to require meaningful
scrutiny of distinctions on grounds that society has come to view as
suspicious. However, what makes the Carson decision so surprising
is that this option was not really open to the House of Lords, other
than in the purely Diceyan sense that Parliament has the power to
defy Strasbourg or withdraw from the ECHR. As Section IV below
will discuss more fully, the ECtHR jurisprudence is clear: the deci-
sion whether Article 14 discrimination has occurred depends funda-
mentally on whether using a distinction on a ground covered by
Article 14 satisfies the principle of proportionality. 72 In Carson, the
Lords accepted that the state distinguished on a ground covered by
Article 14 and yet decided that a court can properly ignore propor-
71. Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB
223 (a bedrock precedent for judicial review in the United Kingdom, calling for courts
not to disturb rules or decisions that fall within the range of decisions that reasonable
state actors might make).
72. Paulik v. Slovakia [2006] ECHR 10699/05; Belgian Linguistics (1968) 1 EHRR
252, para. 10; FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 144-46.
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tionality in concluding that the distinction does not amount to Article
14 discrimination. This clear dismissal of Strasbourg teaching, and
substantial rewriting of the requirements of Article 14, evinces a
profound judicial discomfort with the weighing exercise required by
the justification inquiry. This discomfort shows itself not only in the
Carson trilogy but in the fact that even in cases involving "suspect"
categories, like nationality, sexual orientation, or gender, U.K. courts
base their decisions, either for or against the state, on a critique of
the legitimacy of the state objective, or necessity or suitability of the
means, but almost never on the countervailing weight of the Article
14 interests affected. 73
A finding of unlawful discrimination requires a moral decision,
one that rests on weighing impacts, balancing them against state in-
terests, and setting standards for when state interests must yield to
rights and vice versa. U.K. judges are not comfortable with making
these decisions, which makes the U.S. model extremely attractive.
The suspect classifications approach appears (1) to offer clear bound-
aries to cabin in judicial activism, (2) to avoid judicial moralizing or
standard-setting, and (3) to make it possible to ferret out discrimina-
tion on grounds generally viewed as invidious, without ever needing
to weigh impacts. However, U.S. Equal Protection Clause analysis
does not translate to Article 14, as the American and Strasbourg ju-
risprudence arose out of disparate rights traditions and judicial and
political histories. Moreover, as the next section explains, it is true
that the U.S. approach allows a court to avoid assessing the effects of
discrimination but it fails altogether to shield judges from standard-
setting and balancing, and instead forces them to hide the balancing
that they must perform whether they like it or not.
III. JUSTIFICATION UNDER THE U.S. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Although the HRA does not require the U.K. judiciary to abide
strictly by ECtHR precedent,74 adopting a U.S. model inconsistent
with ECHR requirements is not a legitimate option both because it
violates U.K. judicial policy 75 and because it will ultimately fail to
ensure that the United Kingdom observes its treaty obligations. How-
73. See, e.g., A and Ors v. Home Secretary [2004] UKHL 56; Ghaidan v. Godin-
Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30; R (S) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2004]
UKHL 39; R (Douglas) v. North Tyneside MBC [2004] HRLR 14; R (Morris) v. West-
minster CC [2004] EWHC 2191; Purja and Ors v. Ministry of Defence [2003] EWCA.
Civ 1345; R (Pretty) v. DPP [2002] AC 800; R (Montana) v. Home Secretary [2001]
HRLR 8; R (Mitchell) v. Coventry University [2001] EWHC Admin 167.
74. HRA section 2(1) requires courts to "take into account" the Strasbourg case
law.
75. R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment,
Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23, at para. 26 ("In the absence of some
special circumstances it seems to me that the court should follow any clear and con-
stant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights" (Lord Slynn)).
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ever, an even more compelling reason suggests itself for rejecting the
suspect classifications approach: it only exists as a result of a unique
legal and political history which is not shared by Europe in general
and by the United Kingdom in particular, it derives from a different
constitutional order and it does not work very well even in its own
context. This section establishes these points through three subsec-
tions: the first describes and critiques the existing "suspect classifica-
tions" model, the second explains how it emerged from and makes
sense only in light of its singular context, and the third analyzes the
extent to which it actually accomplishes its objectives.
A. Suspect Classifications and Three-Tiered Scrutiny
Suspect classifications jurisprudence elaborates on the guaran-
tee, found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
that the states may not deprive anyone of the "equal protection of the
laws."76 As this was long considered intended purely to protect the
slaves freed after the American Civil War, courts initially treated it
as only calling for scrutiny of laws that classified according to race. 77
After the famous Carolene Products case in 1938, in which Footnote 4
suggested that heightened scrutiny should apply where necessary to
protect fundamental rights or "discrete and insular minorities,"78 the
concept of "strict scrutiny" was introduced (although it did not really
find expression in EPC jurisprudence until the 1960s). This meant
that when the state impinged on a fundamental right or distin-
guished on a basis that singled out a discrete and insular minority
and thus engaged in a "suspect classification," the Court must apply
"strict scrutiny." A measure would satisfy strict scrutiny if it was
"narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. '79 Any other classi-
fication would satisfy the EPC as long as the distinction bore a ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate objective.80 In essence, the EPC
protected against disparate treatment on illegitimate, irrational or
purely arbitrary grounds, and adopted a presumption that distinc-
tions inimical to a racial minority, or that restricted fundamental lib-
erties, denied that protection.
By the 1970s, the "discrete and insular minority" underpinning
fell away. This is not to say that the U.S. Supreme Court stopped
considering it important that a distinction appeared to burden a
76. Although the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states, an equal protec-
tion guarantee applying to the federal government has been inferred from the due
process guarantee found in the Fifth Amendment.
77. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873); Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1880); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262-63 (1967).
78. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).
79. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
80. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911), quoted in full
in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957); FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
598 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
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group's ability to participate politically but that insularity and minor-
ity status ceased to control whether the Court would view a classifica-
tion as "suspect." The Court began to view racial distinctions as
intrinsically problematic for reasons beyond political participation,
such that racial distinctions that burdened whites, like affirmative
action, were also treated as suspect.8 1 National origin and alienage
have also been found suspect without reference to minority status.8 2
In 1976, responding almost certainly to a growing conviction that dif-
ferential treatment of women and men created social problems rather
than to a conviction that women were an insular minority that could
not participate effectively in the political process, the Court declared
that distinctions on the basis of gender are "quasi-suspect," and must
face "intermediate scrutiny."8 3 Intermediate scrutiny requires that a
challenged law "substantially advance an important state interest."8 4
The Court subsequently applied this level of review to classifications
based on illegitimacy.8 5 The Court has declined to make sexual orien-
tation, mental retardation, disability or age suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications.
The analysis as it stands today begins by asking whether a chal-
lenged distinction rests on a suspect or quasi-suspect ground or bur-
dens a fundamental right. Proving that a measure differentiates on a
suspect or quasi-suspect basis requires showing not only that the law
has the effect of distinguishing on, for example, the grounds of race or
sex, but that it intends to have that effect.8 6 Thus a stop-and-search
profile that has the effect of stopping only persons of Middle-Eastern
or South Asian ethnicity, but not whites, does not receive any height-
81. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 290-93 (1978). There is a
Critical Race Theory (CRT) explanation for the development of EPC jurisprudence,
with which I do not entirely disagree, to the effect that making the EPC protective of
whites and generally prohibitive of true affirmative action makes no sense according
to EPC doctrine, but a lot of sense in terms of maintaining the subordination of Afri-
can-Americans as a group. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Critical Race Theory in Three
Acts: Racial Profiling, Affirmative Action, and the Diversity Visa Lottery 66 ALB. L.
REV. 375 (2003). Because my purpose is to establish the incompatibility of the EPC
approach with Article 14, and the point is strong without them, I prefer not to use
space in the article to defend the CRT claims, which would, if anything, advance the
incompatibility argument. However, it is worth noting that the logic of suspect classi-
fications depends on the oppressive uses to which such classifications have been put
in the past and the logic thus does not apply to cases of affirmative or positive action.
82. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971). Religion is sometimes listed
as a suspect classification but this remains controversial; religious discrimination
often receives strict scrutiny on the ground that it invades the fundamental right to
the free exercise of religion. Employment Div. v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
83. Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The case dealt with a law that allowed
women to buy beer at the age of eighteen, but required men to wait until the age of
twenty-one. There was no suggestion that this law would impair the political partici-
pation of persons of either gender.
84. Id. at 197.
85. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
86. Bradley v. United States, 299 F3d 197 (3rd Cir 2002); 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
14960 at 7.
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ened scrutiny if the state does not act under a motivation to distin-
guish on the basis of ethnicity, but instead acts under a motivation to
target persons who satisfy an intelligence-based profile.8 7 If a chal-
lenged state action neither employs a suspect or quasi-suspect classi-
fication nor restricts a fundamental freedom, then "rational basis"
review applies, calling only for the law to bear a rational relationship
to a legitimate governmental purpose. If a measure distinguishes on
the basis of gender or illegitimacy, it must substantially advance an
important state interest, and if it classifies on the basis of race, na-
tional origin, or alienage, it must be narrowly tailored to a compelling
state interest.
Rational basis review amounts to almost no scrutiny at all. In
the run of cases, the "legitimate state objective" prong of the test re-
quires no more than that the state articulate an interest that the
court accepts as legitimate.88 The court will not generally ask
whether this appears to be the true objective of the measure.8 9 Pro-
vided that what the state claims it seeks to accomplish does not
strike the court as illegitimate, then the rational relationship prong
of the test demands only the existence of "any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classifica-
tion."90 The claimant bears the burden to prove the absence of any
such state of facts and the state need not produce any actual evidence
of its rationale.91 It suffices for the court to imagine a plausible expla-
nation that connects the distinction to the state objective. 92 Over-
breadth and under-inclusiveness are not inconsistent with a rational
basis. 93 Courts have also refused to question the legitimacy of moral-
ity-based objectives like the prohibition of same-sex marriage, which
makes it difficult to challenge a ban on such activities as not ration-
ally related to the objective. 94 At least in theory,95 a claimant who
cannot convince a court to apply heightened scrutiny of some kind
receives no help from the EPC beyond the basic principle of due pro-
cess that laws must be reasonable and legitimate.
87. Aaron Baker, Controlling Racial and Religious Profiling: Article 14 ECHR
Protection v. U.S. Equal Protection Clause Prosecution 13 TEX WESLEYAN L. REV. 285
(2007).
88. Cook v. Rumsfeld 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 397-99 (Mass. 2006).
89. Id. at 399. Compare with Ghaidan [2004] UKHL 30 at paras. 15-18, where
"legitimate objective" was queried extensively, not only with regard to the legitimacy
of the stated aim but regarding whether the workings of the measure suggested this
was the real objective.
90. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
91. Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78-79; Cook, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
92. Cook, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
93. Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 2006 U.S. App LEXIS 17723, 9
(8th Cir).
94. Id. at 7-10.
95. See the discussion of heightened scrutiny in the guise of rational basis review
below at notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
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Strict scrutiny has been called "strict in theory, fatal in fact," but
this is demonstrably not the case.96 The claim comes from the frus-
tration felt by proponents of affirmative or positive action with the
fact that if a law uses a racial distinction, even for a benign purpose,
it must satisfy the same strict test, regardless of the difference, in
social and human rights impacts, of discrimination in favor of an in-
sular minority as opposed to discrimination against one. The affirma-
tive action cases of Grutter v. Bollinger97 and Gratz v. Bollinger98
help illustrate how strict scrutiny works. Grutter concerned the ad-
missions policy of the University of Michigan (graduate) Law School,
and Gratz concerned the admissions policy of the same university's
undergraduate program.99 Both used race as a factor in admissions,
ostensibly to improve diversity for educational purposes. Because the
U.S. Supreme Court would not accept "redressing the racial imbal-
ances created by centuries of slavery and second-class citizenship" as
a compelling state interest, the admissions policies needed to be nar-
rowly tailored to the compelling interest in educational diversity. 100
The undergraduate policy in Gratz used a point system whereby
African-American applicants received additional points because of
their race. 10 1 The law school policy in Grutter took race into account,
but as one of several factors not given a numerical value. 10 2 Narrow
tailoring requires not only that the distinction adopted actually
achieves the objective, but that it imposes no more adverse effects
than are necessary to accomplish the objective. 10 3 Therefore the
Grutter system satisfied strict scrutiny because it had the flexibility
to account for factors other than race, which might contribute to di-
versity and to discount race in a case where it might not actually
make the student body more diverse.' 0 4 By contrast, Gratz did not
pass muster because it was possible in some cases for the points boost
to lead to the admission of a student who did not improve the diver-
sity of the class and, in some other cases, to the rejection of a white
student who might bring some kind of diversity dividend. 10 5 Thus,
any amount of over-breadth or under-inclusiveness, unless unavoida-
ble, is fatal under strict scrutiny. On the other hand, provided that
the measure has no more discriminatory impacts than were neces-
96. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 244.
99. Id.. at 316; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 250-54.
100. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 305-15 (1978). The effect of
Bakke on the objectives proffered in Grutter and Gratz receives further attention be-
low at supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
101. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255-57.
102. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316-22.
103. Id. at 326, 333.
104. Id. at 334-41.
105. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-73.
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sary to accomplish the objective, it will satisfy strict scrutiny regard-
less of the extent of those impacts. 10 6
Owing to the manipulable and variable meanings of the words
"substantially advance" and "important," used in intermediate or
heightened scrutiny, it suffices to say that it is more searching than
rational basis review but less demanding than strict scrutiny. A
fuller discussion must await the third part of this section, discussing
the indeterminacy of the suspect classifications approach.
B. Suspect Classifications in Context
The system of suspect classifications and three-tiered scrutiny
emerged in response to a fear that judges might inject their personal
moral philosophies into constitutional adjudication. This is not, of
course, a fear unique to the U.S. legal landscape. The basis for this
fear, the priority placed on it, and the way in which it found expres-
sion do, however, have a particularly American flavor. The most fun-
damental aspect that sets apart the EPC context is the U.S.
constitutional order itself. Long before Europe or the United King-
dom began recognizing human rights, the United States saw the legal
world as divided into the government sphere and the individual
sphere. 10 7 The government sphere subdivided further into the federal
and state spheres, and into the legislative, executive, and judicial
spheres. Constitutional questions initially involved deciding into
which sphere a given matter fell, from which it would then follow
whether the government could act at all, and if so in what way. Ques-
tions of individual liberty called upon the court to decide, on the basis
of an interpretation of the Constitution or precedent, if the state had
stepped into an area where the individual had sole authority, and if
so, the Constitution had been violated. 108 This individual sphere con-
sisted almost exclusively of civil liberties as opposed to human
rights. 109 In other words, the individual had whatever freedoms were
necessary for full and effective participation in the political system
but not substantive social rights like the right to privacy, or to educa-
tion, or even to non-discrimination: the EPC did not become a part of
the Constitution until 1868.
This formalistic approach to constitutional adjudication held
sway until the 1930s. In the early twentieth century, the judiciary
still saw constitutional law in terms of spheres, leading to results
epitomized by, but by no means limited to, the notorious 1905 Loch-
106. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
107. David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: a Theory of Constitutional Adjudi-
cation 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 646-48 (1994).
108. Id. at 664 ("constitutional questions boil down to a choice between individual
liberty and government interests"); DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAw 76-
118 (2004).
109. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 3-5.
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ner decision, in which the Supreme Court struck down worker-protec-
tive legislation on the ground of the workers' and employers' freedom
of contract. 110 The 1930s saw President Franklin Roosevelt's New
Deal which, through its introduction of unprecedented economic and
labor regulation, sought to pull the United States out of the great
depression. The Court's Lochner doctrine defeated several important
New Deal measures between 1935 and 1937.111 Since Lochner, there
had been a growing clamor amongst academics and jurists demand-
ing a more nuanced and sensitive approach to clashes of community
and individual interest, which received a boost of public support
sparked by the Court's obstruction of the very popular Roosevelt and
the New Deal. In 1937, Roosevelt went so far as to propose his contro-
versial "Court-Packing Bill," which would give him the authority, os-
tensibly, to assist aging justices on the Court, to appoint a new
Supreme Court Justice for every sitting justice over the age of sev-
enty and six months.112 The bill ultimately was defeated, but many
attribute to the very real threat of the bill what is known as "the
switch in time that saved nine": Justice Roberts, who had consist-
ently voted with the majority in the Lochner line of cases, voted with
a new five-to-four majority to approve minimum wage legislation de-
spite its impairment of freedom of contract in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish. 113
Parrish signaled the beginning of a steady rise in the popularity
of balancing as a constitutional methodology. By "balancing" I mean
the practice of weighing the benefits of a challenged state measure
against the significance of the individual liberty interest it invades: it
resembles proportionality but does not necessarily involve weighing
impacts. Balancing had appeared in cases before Parrish'1 4 but it be-
came increasingly fashionable with the rejection of a rigid "rights are
trump" approach. Initially, left-leaning commentators resisted bal-
ancing because it allowed individual rights to be compromised by a
strong public interest, but it later became clear that balancing could
expand rights as well as restrict them.115 Indeed, in the heyday of
balancing, in the 1950s and 1960s, concern began to grow that bal-
ancing simply gave judges the freedom to choose which interests they
considered more important, in keeping with their own moral or politi-
110. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
111. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936).
112. Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937.
113. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
114. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
115. Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in an Age of Balancing 96
YALE L. J. 943, 960-61 (1987).
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cal philosophy. 116 Critics feared not only that judges might balance
away fundamental rights but that they might second-guess legisla-
tive determinations, as in Lochner, but with a more subtle and
facially appealing tool. Several important voices called for a return to
some kind of interpretive approach, which would limit the Court's job
to a textual, historical, or precedential analysis to arrive at what the
Constitution required. 117
Thus far the discussion has applied to U.S. constitutional adjudi-
cation in general. Balancing did not really have much of an effect on
the EPC until the 1960s. From Plessy v. Ferguson'1 8 in 1896 until
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka"1 9 in 1954, the EPC applied
almost exclusively to race and nationality claims and pursued a defi-
nitional "spheres" approach. 120 When the Court adopted the "sepa-
rate-but-equal" doctrine in Plessy it noted that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not guarantee equality in social arrangements but
only in political freedoms. 1 21 From then until Brown, almost all EPC
cases were brought by African-Americans claiming that separate pro-
vision by the state was not really equal.122 For the EPC to apply, the
difference in treatment needed to involve either an unequal provision
by the state or a burden on political participation. Brown itself went
no further than to say that separate was not equal in public educa-
tion, holding to the same view of the EPC as protecting political
equality. There was generally no overt discussion about balancing:
the activity affected by the distinction either was or was not covered
by the EPC.
The shameful Korematsu123 case represents a notable exception.
It is in this case that the idea of heightened scrutiny of racial classifi-
cations first appeared. On its way to holding that the U.S. military
could lawfully herd all Japanese-Americans into internment camps
116. THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 717-18 (1970);
MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, ch.
3 (1966); Laurent Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Men-
delson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729, 746-49 (1963); Laurent Frantz, The First Amendment in
the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1442-45 (1962); Alexander Meiklejohn, The Baren-
blatt Opinion, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (1960); Alexander Meiklejohn, The Balancing of
Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CAL. L. REV. 4 (1961); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, SuP. CT. REV. 245 (1961).
117. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises Inc., 486 U.S. 888,
897-98 (1988) (Scalia, J. concurring); Frank N. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Pro-
tean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 19 (1988); Louis Henkin, Infallibility
Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1047 (1978).
118. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
119. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
120. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
121. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, para. 2 (1896).
122. Bakke, 438 U. S. at 290-93.
123. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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during World War II, the Court did as courts often do: it heralded a
capitulation to the state by announcing how tough it intended to be.
Justice Black wrote that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect" and that
"courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."124 The Court
proceeded to rely, however, on unsubstantiated claims by an Army
General to the effect that only internment of the Japanese could safe-
guard national security and to find the practice constitutional. 125
Thus, the idea of non-categorical protection, where a racial classifica-
tion is not necessarily barred but calls for a particularly high level of
scrutiny, came into being because of what the Court viewed as the
necessity of allowing the state to do something which would, under
the definitional analysis previously employed, clearly violate the
EPC.
The Court came close to articulating the modern version of strict
scrutiny in 1964 in McLaughlin v. Florida,126 where it announced
that race-based classifications are "constitutionally suspect" and sub-
ject to "rigid scrutiny." Thus a racially discriminatory law could stand
"only if... necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accom-
plishment of a permissible state policy. '127 The strict scrutiny test
did not take on its final form until the introduction of the "compelling
state interest" and "narrow tailoring" language in 1984.128 As we
have already seen, the Court soon found itself faced with challenges
that did not relate to race but to gender, or mental retardation, or
illegitimacy. In the political climate of the 1970s and 1980s, the Court
could not restrict the application of the EPC to racial issues but it
honored the history and "original intent" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by maintaining tiers of scrutiny. The discipline of first finding
at least a quasi-suspect classification warded off complaints that ac-
tivist judges were legislating new grounds of forbidden discrimina-
tion simply to suit their own ideas of social justice. Making the
scrutiny "strict" insulated the judiciary from the other complaint
about balancing, that it allowed the compromising of basic liberties.
The period during which the suspect classifications approach
emerged witnessed a furious debate over balancing and whether a
court should apply rules or standards (standards being associated
with balancing). Balancing, not necessarily under the EPC but in
other areas of constitutional law, had enjoyed such dominance, that a
great deal of momentum had developed in favor of limiting the discre-
tion of judges to substitute their judgment for that of the legislature.
124. Id. at 215.
125. Id. at 218-19.
126. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
127. Id. at 196.
128. See generally Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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Professor Alan Chen summarizes the terms of the debate as they ap-
plied to the EPC:
In the context of constitutional law, the rules-standards de-
bate is sometimes described using the nomenclature of "cate-
gories" and "balancing." Categories connote that any given
government regulation, or any act by a public official, can be
placed into a particular category, which leads to a determi-
nate result. The bookends of strict scrutiny and rationality
review, which are used to examine the constitutionality of
government classification under the Equal Protection
Clause .... illustrate the use of categorical, or rule-like, con-
stitutional constraints. In theory, the compelling or legiti-
mate state interest tests formally direct the decisionmaker
to engage in a kind of balancing. In its actual application,
however, strict scrutiny is rule-like, since if a court con-
cludes that a government regulation involves suspect classi-
fications or burdens "fundamental" rights, the result is, for
all intents and purposes, determinate-the regulation is in-
validated. Rationality review is equally determinate in the
other direction-the regulation is virtually always
upheld. 129
In short, although the doctrine arose because of the necessity of al-
lowing a strong public interest to outweigh even the fundamental
right of racial non-discrimination (Korematsu), its form reflects a
grudging victory for the rule advocates (represented today by, for ex-
ample, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts).
This admittedly rough history of the suspect classifications
model draws attention to at least three significant circumstances
that make that model unique to its context. First, it comes from a
tradition where constitutional discrimination cases ask whether the
state has attempted to invade the sphere of the individual's civil or
political liberties. Although the Court no longer limits the application
of the EPC to cases that directly impact the equality of political par-
ticipation, the idea that the EPC exists primarily to protect civil lib-
erties-not human rights-frequently comes into play to resolve close
cases. 130 This characteristic means, inter alia, that the EPC does not
even apply unless the state intends to discriminate and only the most
persuasive statistics can prove discriminatory intent on the basis of
129. Alan Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Consti-
tutional Balancing Tests 81 IowA L. REV. 261, 298 (1995).
130. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789-806 (1983); The Forty-Second
Street Co. v. Koch, 613 F. Supp. 1416, 1985 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17750, 17-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971).
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discriminatory impacts. 131 It also means that different levels of pro-
tection are required in order to recognize that different grounds of
distinction implicate different political obstacles. Second, the EPC is
associated historically with the protection of a specific racial minor-
ity. Given the general reliance of American Constitutional law on tex-
tual and historical interpretation, this required that in
accommodating different kinds of classifications that ought logically
to receive scrutiny, the Court felt constrained to tie the extent of scru-
tiny to the degree of similarity between a challenged classification
and a racial classification. 132 Finally, the suspect classifications
model was not adopted as a considered approach to rebutting a prima
facie case of discrimination. Instead, it was adopted (1) as a means of
allowing (perhaps with Roosevelt's court-packing plan not yet a dis-
tant memory, and certainly affected by the hysteria of war) the state
to override what had formerly been treated as a categorical constitu-
tional protection, and (2) later, to respond to concerns on one hand
that fundamental rights might too easily be overridden, and on the
other, that the EPC might grow beyond its political, anti-racism roots
to become a roving anti-discrimination tool in the hands of an activist
judiciary. All of these circumstances have produced an EPC that pur-
posely offers no protection beyond the basic demands of due process,
except with regard to a narrow class of distinctions; that focuses on
the intentions of the state; that classifies levels of protection in order
to respect the centrality of race and political rights as its focus; and
that seeks to make outcomes appear to be dictated by categorical
rules.
C. Three-Tiered Scrutiny Collapses into Ad-Hoc Balancing
The foregoing discussion has highlighted some reasons why the
United Kingdom and Strasbourg should reject the EPC approach
even if this approach does what it claims to do. However, one of the
most compelling reasons not to adopt the suspect classifications/
three-tiered scrutiny analysis is that it does not deliver on the one
concern common to both the EPC and the ECHR/HRA context: it does
not control judicial discretion. As we have seen, distrust of propor-
tionality among U.K. judges, has led them either to suppress the ulti-
mate proportionality balancing or to adopt rules like that in Carson.
In this they share with their American counterparts the desire to
avoid making value judgments and to reduce their task to one of di-
vining the nature of the classification at issue and applying to the
state action-not to its effects-the level of scrutiny dictated. They
purport, through such a mechanism, to avoid judging the value of
131. Bradley v. United States, 299 F3d 197 (3rd Cir. 2002); Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613 (1982).
132. Bakke, 438 U. S. at 290; Beatty, supra note 108, at 40-42, 76-118.
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particular public interests, to avoid expressing preferences for one so-
cial policy over another, and to avoid, except in the most extreme cir-
cumstances, being called upon to countermand the will of the
majority. Setting aside for the moment the fact that the ECHR as
applied through the HRA does not permit U.K. judges to avoid all of
these tasks, it would make a sad hash of things indeed if the United
Kingdom flouted Strasbourg precedent in favor of borrowing a U.S.
approach that does not even work in the United States.
The suspect classifications/three-tiered scrutiny model does not,
by acclamation of commentators on both sides of the U.S. balancing
debate, work. It fails for four basic reasons: (1) the identification of
classifications as quasi-suspect, suspect, or non-suspect involves un-
constrained (except perhaps by history and science) balancing of pub-
lic and private interests, and political and social interests; (2)
intermediate scrutiny, which arose in response to the intolerable ri-
gidity of the strict scrutiny/rational basis dichotomy, would be better
named "indeterminate scrutiny" as it appears to require a different
degree of "substantial advancement" of state interests depending
upon (one might say "proportional to") the ground and degree of dis-
crimination; (3) rational basis review has recently grown teeth in
non-suspect cases involving substantial discriminatory impact, and
justices balance by treating over-breadth as irrational, or by second-
guessing the purported legitimate objective; and (4) the identification
of "compelling state interests" requires balancing and the interest
that the court views as compelling prejudges what will qualify as
"narrowly tailored" to that interest. I will substantiate each of these
claims in turn.
Deciding to label a classification "suspect" obviously and necessa-
rily involves a balancing of interests. To say, for example, that a dis-
tinction on the basis of sexual orientation is suspect requires a
decision about what kinds of intrusions on personal liberty we deem
acceptable and what kinds of different treatment implicate human
rights or civil liberties concerns. The question requires balancing, on
one hand, the strength of the claim homosexual persons have to being
treated the same as heterosexuals, as well as their history of oppres-
sion, against, on the other, any legitimate interests the majority may
have in singling out homosexuals for special treatment, and the
greater value U.S. jurisprudence places on present political participa-
tion over a history of oppression. U.S. legal and social culture tips the
scales through its focus on political rights, and on the paradigm of
racial discrimination, as well as by a regrettably popular belief that
homosexuals-and their non-political activities-are fundamentally
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different from and less valued than heterosexuals. 133 The subjectivity
of the exercise finds expression in the very fact that the United States
does not view sexual orientation as a suspect classification and, ac-
cording to Lord Walker in Carson, the ECtHR does.134 The status of
gender as a quasi-suspect classification in the United States, in con-
trast to race which is fully suspect, turns on (1) the fact that some
gender distinctions are valued, while almost no racial distinctions are
valued; (2) the fact that many inequalities suffered by women are so-
cial, thus less valued, while most of the inequalities suffered by racial
minorities are deemed political, thus more valued; and (3) the fact
that the U.S. values protecting political minorities more than protect-
ing a non-minority with a history of oppression. Thus any approach
that calibrates its calculus according to varying degrees of "suspect-
ness" simply sweeps its balancing under the rug. Indeed, when the
Lords in Carson found that residence was not a suspect category they
simply made an ad hoc assessment of the relative weights of the
claim of non-residents to equal treatment and the reasons society
might have for treating them differently and concluded that they val-
ued the latter over the former.
Intermediate scrutiny also leads to balancing: indeed, it exists
owing to an irresistible urge to balance. To catalog the cases in which
the Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny in context-spe-
cific and proportionate ways would simply repeat what many have
done amply well before me. 135 Although one could in theory define
the phrases "substantially advance" and "important state interest" in
determinate ways, it is clear that the Court has not done so. 1 3 6 The
words "substantial" and "important" invite courts to make value
judgments and courts have understandably used them to tailor their
decisions to the facts. Some applications have held that "substan-
tially advances" requires no more than that the legislation not be
"over-broad" or based on generalizations or stereotypes.1 37 By con-
trast, the most recent authoritative articulation in the gender context
went so far as to call for "skeptical scrutiny," requiring an "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" for discriminatory policies.138 The
133. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (the State of Colorado adopted,
by popular referendum, a state constitutional amendment outlawing any legislative
attempt to protect the rights of homosexuals).
134. Carson [2005] UKHL 37 at para. 58.
135. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 115; Faigman, supra note 107; Peter
Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States Supreme Court
Adopted a "Sliding Scale" Approach Toward Equal Protection Jurisprudence? 23 J.
CONTEMP. L. 475 (1997).
136. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 503-06 (1976); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-67 (1977); Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978).
137. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
138. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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Court in United States v. Virginia declared that gender distinctions
require more scrutiny than the similarly quasi-suspect classification
of illegitimacy. 139 This in essence sets up four openly acknowledged
tiers of review. This burgeoning of intermediate standards evidences
what many have recognized as the inevitability of judges balanc-
ing. 140 No matter how their inquiry is structured, courts cannot de-
cide when a difference in treatment is acceptable and when it is not
without balancing the value of the state action against the value of
equal treatment. It is telling in this regard that several U.S. state
supreme courts have, when applying their own states' constitutions,
recognized this fact and dispensed with tiers of scrutiny in favor of
balancing state interests against discriminatory impacts. 14'
Balancing likewise finds its way into the application of rational
basis review: the standard has more or less teeth depending on the
severity of the discrimination. The fact that this occurs within ra-
tional basis review as opposed to forming part of the proliferation of
different degrees of heightened scrutiny, highlights a problem unique
to a suspect classifications model. The very existence of the three (or
more) -tiered discipline creates a resistance to the entrenchment of
new suspect classifications. Because enshrinement as "suspect" tilts
the scales for all future cases, the judiciary finds ways to avoid mak-
ing a commitment in any given case. This creates the doubly prob-
lematic situation where (1) courts turn a blind eye to emerging
suspect distinctions (like sexual orientation or age), or (2) they reach
the "right" result within the rational basis standard, doing violence to
that standard in the process. For example, in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,142 the Court faced a challenge to the
denial, by a municipality, of a permit for a group of mentally retarded
persons to set up a group home. After a careful balancing, the Court
held that mental disability did not amount to a suspect or quasi-sus-
pect classification, and applied rational basis scrutiny. However, the
Court in effect shifted the burden to the state, noting that the record
revealed no evidence that the home represented a "special threat to
the city's legitimate interests," and finding the denial unconstitu-
tional.143 Similarly, in Romer v. Evans the Court struck down a Colo-
rado constitutional amendment, enacted by referendum, that
139. Id. at 531-34.
140. BEATTY, supra note 108, at 25-35; Smith, supra note 140, generally; Peter J.
Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scru-
tiny after Adarand and Shaw 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15-25 (2000); RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 et seq (1997).
141. Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, 762 A.2d. 620, 631-32
(N.J. 2000); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 835-36 (N.H. 1988); Marcoux v. Attorney
General, 375 N.E.2d 688, 689 (Mass. 1978).
142. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
143. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
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outlawed any legislation designed to protect homosexuals.144 Ra-
tional basis review took the form of a searching assessment of the
purpose of the initiative, brushing aside Colorado's proffered "protec-
tion of morals" objective. 145 The Court rejected as illegitimate the
true purpose of the measure, revealed by the fact that its "sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state in-
terests." Compare these decisions with the test that should, at least
on paper, accept the stated objective at face value along with "any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational ba-
sis for the classification"146 and it becomes clear that the balancing
imperative expresses itself through the rational basis test as well as
through intermediate scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny should afford the least scope for covert balancing.
On the claimant's side, a measure not narrowly tailored to a compel-
ling state interest cannot be rescued by even the most pressing public
need. On the state's side, no place in the rubric allows the most dras-
tically discriminatory effects to condemn a measure that constitutes
the least restrictive alternative available to meet the state's aims.
However, because strict scrutiny places the fit of the state action to
its objective at the center of the analysis, the nature of the objective
itself can dictate the outcome. In the Gratz and Grutter cases, one
affirmative action policy fell and the other stood because the first did
both more and less than required by the objective and the second did
not. In both cases the state identified its objective as the improve-
ment of diversity for educational purposes. However, the University
based the adoption of that particular objective on Justice Powell's
opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,147 where a
fragmented five to four decision appeared to establish that diversity
amounted to a compelling state interest but remedying past injustice
did not.148 Although a solid majority of the Supreme Court has not
squarely addressed this issue, other precedents suggests that the
Court would not accept as compelling any state interest that con-
sciously favors one race over another any time soon. 149 Had the Court
tested the narrow tailoring of the undergraduate policy in Gratz
against an interest in remedying past injustice, it would almost cer-
tainly find the policy of automatically increasing the likelihood of ad-
mission of African-Americans narrowly tailored to the objective.
144. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
145. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-36.
146. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
147. 438 U. S. 265 (1978).
148. Id. at 305-15.
149. Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 642-48 (1993).
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Given that the Court generally defers to lawmakers and executives
when they claim that national security, or crime prevention, or the
protection of fetal life constitute compelling interests, the decision
that remedying past racial injustice does not implicate a compelling
public interest can only rest on a balancing of interests. Justice Pow-
ell's decision in Bakke found that the invidious effects of making
whites bear the cost of remedying social injustice outweighed the ad-
vantages to society of improving the social balance. 150 Thus, it is only
in the easy cases when no disagreement exists about the importance
of the state aim that even the rigid discipline of strict scrutiny can
prevent an ad hoc balancing of interests.
IV. How ARTICLE 14 JUSTIFICATION SHOULD WORK
The decision of the House of Lords in Carson sought to accom-
plish what the long history of EPC jurisprudence aspired to: an ap-
proach to discrimination claims that insulates judges from the task of
deciding when a majority-supported policy can displace the liberties
guaranteed by law. By emulating the U.S. solution to this problem,
however, the Lords not only relied on a false promise of determinacy
but chose a direction strikingly at odds with the jurisprudence it was
adopted to serve. Article 14 differs from the EPC in four fundamental
respects: (1) Article 14 does not focus on race-based distinctions or
political liberties, but is a human rights guarantee that the equal en-
joyment of rights will not suffer discriminatory burdens on status
grounds; (2) ECtHR jurisprudence requires that discrimination, on
any of the undifferentiated grounds on Article 14's open-ended list,
satisfy proportionality; (3) Strasbourg's treatment of some grounds of
distinction as requiring "very weighty reasons" for justification is not
multi-tiered scrutiny, but instead operates to calibrate proportional-
ity in the light of prior value determinations; and (4) Article 14 fo-
cuses on a different "meaning" of equality from that served by the
U.S. suspect classifications approach. All of these differences make
Article 14 expressly about the kind of value judgments a suspect clas-
sifications model seeks to avoid.
A. Article 14 is a Human Rights Guarantee
A facial reading of Article 14 suffices to demonstrate that it does
not, by virtue of text, history, or implication, elevate one kind of dis-
crimination over another. The ECtHR has held its list of status
grounds protected from discrimination to be open-ended and to in-
clude not only immutable characteristics but social circumstances
that derive to some extent from choice.' 5 ' Neither the wording of the
150. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-08.
151. Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania [20041 ECHR 395, para. 41; Kjeldsen,
Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark (1976) 1 EHRR 711, para. 56.
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article, the travaux prdparatoires, nor any Strasbourg authority sup-
port the idea that any one or a handful of grounds of discrimination
drove the adoption of Article 14. Although racial discrimination cer-
tainly weighed on the minds of the drafters of the ECHR, so too did
the social and economic impacts of excluding women from full partici-
pation in society and the tendency of governments to interfere with
the expression by national minorities of their cultural identity.1 52 Ar-
ticle 14 does not, therefore, call for different treatment of classifica-
tions based on the extent to which they resemble one or more core
prohibited distinctions.
There likewise exists no reason to view the ECHR as amounting
essentially to a scheme to protect political freedoms. Although many
of the rights and freedoms of the Convention do protect civil liberties,
and certainly the ECtHR has invoked political participation as an in-
terest the Convention seeks to advance, the ECHR sets out a struc-
ture of human rights-guarantees of substantive liberty deemed
worthy of protection based on the value of human dignity.1 53 The
Convention cannot support a hierarchy of rights based on the extent
of their instrumentality to full political participation. It seeks to pro-
tect people from encroachments on their rights because, in the case of
some rights, respect for those rights brings not only political but so-
cial benefits, but also because it treats them as ends in themselves. 154
Thus Article 14 protects against discrimination not merely where it
impairs the political process but where it undermines equal dignity
and respect. Lords Hoffman and Walker in Carson gestured toward
equal dignity and respect as touchstones for a suspect classifica-
tion. 155 However, while a court might, as the U.S. Supreme Court
has, perform an abstract assessment of the impact of a ground of dis-
tinction on political participation-asking, for example, whether or
not women are a discrete and insular minority-no court can assess
the impact of a ground of discrimination on equal respect or dignity
without assessing the proportionality of the distinction as applied.
Whether a distinction on the ground of, say, residence implicates dig-
nity or respect depends upon how senselessly, and to what effect, the
distinction burdens the claimant. If a law requires that all people
over seventy get an eye test before renewing their driving license,
this might not offend equal dignity; if another law requires those
same people to wear incontinence undergarments purely on the basis
of their age, dignity almost certainly comes into play. Neither case
152. TRAVAJX PRPPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
Article 14, 4-5, 23, 25 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 1967) available at http://www.
echr.coe.intlLibrary/DIGDOC/TravauxECHRTravaux-ART14-CDH(67)3-BIL13389
01.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
153. Id. at 2; FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 3-5, 50-52.
154. Timishev v. Russia, [2005] ECHR 55762/00., paras. 53-59.
155. Carson, [2005] UKHL 37 at paras. 15-17, 55-60.
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tells us abstractly whether distinctions on the basis of age implicate
equal dignity or respect. In the Article 14 context, it is the operation
of proportionality itself that tells us whether a classification is sus-
pect, not an a priori assessment of the relationship between a classifi-
cation and a core convention value.
B. Article 14 Requires Proportionality in All Cases
Perhaps for that very reason, proportionality represents a funda-
mental characteristic of lawful distinctions under Article 14. Recall
that in Belgian Linguistics the ECtHR defined discrimination in
terms of disproportionate differences in treatment. 156 As even the
majority in Carson could not avoid admitting, the insurmountable
weight of Strasbourg authority has resolved Article 14 cases on the
basis of a proportionality justification. 157 No ECtHR case involving a
difference in treatment on a ground covered by Article 14 has author-
ized not subjecting the challenged measure to scrutiny and cases in-
volving non-suspect classification routinely apply proportionality to
clearly "rational" distinctions, in pursuit of legitimate aims, and find
them disproportionate.158 Although some cases have parried propor-
tionality concerns with reference to the "margin of appreciation," that
concept does not apply in a purely domestic context. The "area of dis-
cretionary judgment," a domestic analog of the margin, can shift the
balance in favor of justification of a state measure but only as a part
of that analysis, not as a reason not to engage in it. 15 9 Indeed, prior to
Carson, the House of Lords clearly recognized that proportionality
formed an integral part of the Article 14 analysis.160
In support of his plug for suspect classifications in Carson, Lord
Walker discussed two cases in which the ECtHR refused to apply pro-
portionality to an alleged distinction on covered grounds, where the
case came within the ambit of another Convention right. In Van der
Mussele v. Belgium,' 6' the ECtHR rejected a claim that requiring a
pupil barrister to provide free legal services while, for example, doc-
tors or accountants did not incur similar obligations, constituted Arti-
cle 14 discrimination. Owing to differences in the entire regimes
governing various professions, the Court was unable to identify a dis-
crete decision where it could say that the status "lawyer" was used as
a criterion for distinction.16 2 Van der Mussele therefore stands for no
156. Belgian Linguistics (1968) 1 EHRR 252, para. 10.
157. Carson, [2005] UKHL 37 at paras. 75-76; Comparison, supra note 41, at 11-
14.
158. Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania [2004] ECHR 395, paras. 51-61; Paulik v.
Slovakia [2006] ECHR 10699/05, para. 58.
159. Ghaidan [2004] UKHL 30, paras. 19-23.
160. A and Ors [20041 UKHL 56, para. 50; Ghaidan, [2004] UKHL 30, para. 133.
161. (1983) 6 EHRR 163; compare Gaygusuz v. Austria (1996) 23 EHRR 365, pa-
ras. 42-50.
162. (1983) 6 EHRR 163, paras. 45-46.
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more than the proposition that the absence of an analogous compara-
tor, in the sense of someone whose fate was determined by criteria
sufficiently similar to pinpoint the ground of disparate treatment as
the one complained of, deprives a court of a clear distinction to jus-
tify. In Johnston v. Ireland,163 the Strasbourg Court clearly stated
that it could not consider the comparators analogous because another
basis for differentiation applicable only to the claimants, specifically
a failure to be ordinarily domiciled outside Ireland, constituted an
express factor in the challenged decision, making it impossible for the
Court to conclude that the ground for distinction was wealth (or the
lack thereof). Thus neither case supports a restriction of proportion-
ality review to suspect classifications only.
By contrast, the recent (post-Carson) Strasbourg opinion in Pau-
lik v. Slovakia 164 shows the proper approach to non-suspect cases.
There the petitioner complained of the state's refusal to revisit a prior
judicial determination of paternity. In Slovakia those whose pater-
nity had been declared by presumption (based on, for example, mar-
riage to the mother) had access to a procedure to challenge the
determination through DNA evidence, while those like the claimant,
whose determination was based on a judicial hearing-before the
availability of DNA evidence-could not (on res judicata grounds). In
this case the ground of discrimination was the status of having had
paternity declared in a judicial proceeding. The Court made no men-
tion of a need for "weighty reasons" in this case of a clearly non-sus-
pect classification. Much like in Carson, the state tried to dispose of
the case on analogous comparator grounds, claiming that the absence
of a resjudicata prior determination, with its legal certainty implica-
tions, made his comparators relevantly different from the claimant.
The Strasbourg court did what the Lords in Carson should have done:
The Court accepts that there may be differences between, on
the one hand, the applicant and, on the other hand, the puta-
tive fathers and the mothers in situations where paternity is
legally presumed but has not been judicially determined.
However, the fact that there are some differences between
two or more individuals does not preclude them from being
in sufficiently comparable positions and from having suffi-
ciently comparable interests. The Court finds that with re-
gard to their interest in contesting a status relating to
paternity, the applicant and the other parties in question
were in an analogous situation for the purposes of art 14 of
the Convention. The legal system afforded them different
treatment in that, unlike the other parties, the applicant
163. (1986) 9 EHRR 203.
164. [2006] ECHR 10699/05.
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could not request the Prosecutor General to challenge the
declaration of paternity in the courts in the interests of soci-
ety. It remains to be ascertained whether this difference had
any objective and reasonable justification. 165
The Court then applied proportionality, and found that the
state's interest in legal certainty could not outweigh the fact that the
claimant had no access to a remedy available to others in similar sit-
uations. In doing so, the Court observed that "the 'legitimate interest'
in ensuring legal certainty and the security of family relationships
and in protecting the interests of children may justify a difference in
the treatment of persons with an interest in disclaiming paternity,"
but that in this case the kind and extent of difference in treatment
was disproportionate to the strength of that interest. 166
The Lords in Carson were just wrong. Non-suspect classifications
must satisfy proportionality, even if there exist rational, legitimate
grounds for distinct treatment in the abstract.
C. Article 14 Proportionality does not Involve Pre-set Tiers of
Scrutiny
The proportionality required under Article 14 calls for an assess-
ment of the impact of the challenged distinction on other legitimate
interests and a determination whether the use of that distinction con-
tributes sufficiently to the public interest to outweigh the impact.
Proportionality entered into European law through German law,
which developed a doctrine of proportionality requiring that state
acts or measures be (1) suitable to achieve a legitimate purpose, (2)
necessary to achieve that purpose, and (3) proportional in the nar-
rower sense: measures must not impose burdens or "cause harms to
other legitimate interests" that outweigh the objectives achieved by
the measure. 167 This formulation has not been adopted wholesale
into the jurisprudence of Article 14, but the last element, "proportion-
ality in the narrower sense," was incorporated into the Article 14
analysis in the Belgian Linguistics case, which was in fact the first
mention of the doctrine of proportionality by the ECtHR. 168 The for-
mulation adopted there required "proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realized.' 69 Later courts have
interpreted this as meaning that "the means employed" (a classifica-
165. Id. at para. 54 (internal citations omitted).
166. Id. at para. 58.
167. Lord Hoffmann, The Influence of the European Principle of Proportionality
upon U.K. Law, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 107
(Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999) (this is the same Lord Hoffmann of the Carson decision).
168. Marc-Andre Eissen, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 140 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
169. Belgian Linguistics (1968) 1 EHRR 252, para. 10.
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tion on a given ground) must not produce "harms to other legitimate
interests" disproportionate to how far the classification advances a
legitimate aim.170 Proportionality therefore contemplates a situation
where the harm of a measure, in terms of the extent of invasion of an
individual's rights, or in terms of the damage to common interests in
equal dignity and social inclusion for example, could outweigh the
benefits of even a narrowly tailored measure aimed at a compelling
interest.
Indeed, this is precisely what happened in Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom,171 where the ECtHR found unjustified a law in Northern
Ireland that outlawed homosexual sex between consenting adults. Al-
though the Court resolved the claim on Article 8 grounds (the right to
respect for private life), the Strasbourg Court has made it abundantly
clear that it views the application of proportionality under Article 8
as equivalent to that under Article 14.172 In analyzing whether the
measure satisfied proportionality, the Court noted that the state
could not have more narrowly tailored its regulation:
Without any doubt.., the United Kingdom Government ac-
ted carefully and in good faith; what is more, they made
every effort to arrive at a balanced judgment between the
differing viewpoints before reaching the conclusion that such
a substantial body of opinion in Northern Ireland was op-
posed to a change in the law that no further action should be
taken. Nevertheless, this cannot of itself be decisive as to the
necessity for the interference with the applicant's private life
resulting from the measures being challenged. Notwith-
standing the margin of appreciation left to the national au-
thorities, it is for the Court to make the final evaluation as to
whether the reasons it has found to be relevant were suffi-
cient in the circumstances, in particular whether the inter-
ference complained of was proportionate to the social need
claimed for it.173
The Court then went on to hold that, "on the issue of proportion-
ality, the Court considers that such justifications as there are for re-
taining the law in force un-amended are outweighed by the
detrimental effects which the very existence of the legislative provi-
sions in question can have on the life of a person of homosexual orien-
170. A and Ors v. Home Secretary [2004] UKHL 56, para. 50; Ghaidan v. Godin-
Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, paras. 19-20; National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium
1 EHRR 578, para. 49 (1975).
171. [1981] 4 EHRR 149.
172. Evans v. UK [2006] ECHR 6339/05, para. 74.
173. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom [1981] 4 EHRR 149, para. 59 (internal citations
omitted).
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tation like the applicant. '174 Earlier in its opinion the Court had
catalogued these effects and commented on the vast number of people
affected and the sweeping extent of the effect in terms of the ability of
those people to act according to their inclinations. The Court's analy-
sis considered not only the effect of the law on the claimant but on all
homosexuals, and thus on society as a whole. Proportionality in
Strasbourg routinely takes into account impacts not only on the
claimant but on the claimant's group, upon society as a whole, and
upon the general interest in non-discrimination. 175 Thus there can be
no doubt that under Article 14, proportionality means that profound
effects of discrimination can outweigh the benefits even of a measure
that represents the least restrictive alternative available. By the
same token, it means that even very flawed acts of government can
withstand scrutiny if they do not cause severe detrimental impacts.
Lord Walker in Carson simply made a mistake when he sug-
gested that Strasbourg had identified suspect classifications. The
ECtHR has certainly noted that some kinds of discrimination require
"very weighty reasons" for justification, but to characterize that prac-
tice as akin to the U.S. approach reveals a lack of understanding of
the EPC jurisprudence. To have anything in common with the U.S.
model, the Strasbourg practice would need to (1) dispense with all
non-suspect cases through rational basis review, and (2) subject sus-
pect classifications to a rigid test of fit between the means and the
objective. As we have seen, in non-suspect cases, the Strasbourg
Court applies proportionality. Not surprisingly, the test the court ap-
plies in so-called suspect cases is: proportionality. For example, in
Smith v. U.K176 the Court, confronted with the ban on gays in the
military, observed that discrimination on the ground of sexual orien-
tation required "convincing and weighty reasons.., by way of justifi-
cation."'1 77 The Court proceeded, however, carefully to evaluate the
kind and degree of the invasion into the private lives of the claimants
and the general impacts of the ban and related investigations on gay
and lesbian soldiers, and weighed those against a painstaking assess-
ment of the evidence in support of the policy and the state's reasons
for maintaining it.178 The only difference between this inquiry and
the one in the non-suspect case of Paulik lies in the fact that the
174. Id. at para. 60.
175. Unal Takeli v. Turkey [2004] ECHR 29865/96, paras. 59-69 (invoking the im-
pact of a rule requiring wives to take on the names of their husbands on the European
interest in advancing gender equality); Smith and another v. U.K. [1999] ECHR
33985/96, 90-94 (cataloguing the impacts of sexual orientation discrimination on
homosexuals in the military, including on job prospects); Sidabras [20041 ECHR 395,
paras. 51-61 (noting the long-term impacts of anti-former-KGB-agent ban on the ca-
reers and prospects of those affected by it).
176. [1999] ECHR 33985/96.
177. Smith, [19991 ECHR 33985/96, paras. 90-105.
178. Id. at para. 94.
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Court put on the petitioner's side of proportionality a strong public
interest in not treating people differently on the ground of sexual
orientation.
The Strasbourg "suspect classifications" practice means no more
than that with regard to certain kinds of discrimination, the Court
puts its thumb on the claimant's side of the scale but otherwise ap-
plies proportionality as usual. The great error of the majority in Car-
son stemmed from identifying, on one hand, Strasbourg's
acknowledgement within a proportionality analysis that society
places a greater value on preventing some kinds of discrimination
than others with, on the other hand, the U.S. paradigm that hinges a
three (four?) -tiered scrutiny system on degrees of "suspectness" and
purports not to use proportionality at all. As a result of this error (or
sleight-of-hand?) the Lords dispensed with proportionality in direct
conflict with ECtHR precedent.
D. Article 14 and Suspect Classifications Assume Different
"Meanings" of Equality
The Carson mistake could flow, at least in part, from confusion
about the purposes of equality provisions like Article 14, the Equal
Protection Clause, and statutory anti-discrimination laws. Christo-
pher McCrudden has argued that equality can have at least four
"meanings," and that laws can evolve or be designed in distinct ways
depending on the meanings of equality that underpin them. 179 He
identifies (1) "equality as 'rationality,"' (2) "equality as protective of
'prized public goods,"' (3) "equality as preventing 'status harms,"' and
(4) "equality as promotion of equal opportunity between groups." He
observes that the first meaning is reflected in both the United States
and the United Kingdom in the concepts of "rational basis review"
and "likes should be treated alike" respectively.' 8 0 These are baseline
protections, afforded even to non-suspect classifications in the United
States and as a general principle of public law in the United King-
dom. He goes on to observe that EPC jurisprudence gives effect to the
second meaning by affording "strict scrutiny" to invasions of funda-
mental rights ("prized public goods"), and to the third meaning by
subjecting discrimination on specified grounds to heightened scru-
tiny, to avoid (e.g., race-related) "status harms."1 a' United Kingdom
statutory antidiscrimination laws clearly seek, according to McCrud-
den, to prevent status harms resulting from, e.g., gender and race
discrimination.' 8 2 Article 14, however, he sees as directed at the sec-
179. Christopher McCrudden, Equality and Non-Discrimination, in ENGLISH PUB-
LI LAw 582-84 (David Feldman ed., 2004).
180. Id. at 582, n.3; 608-15.
181. Id. at 582, f.3.
182. Id. at 637.
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ond meaning, the protection of the equal distribution of the "prized
public goods" represented by the other rights in the ECHR.' 8 3 Given
that Article 14 expressly, and on its face exclusively, guarantees the
equal enjoyment of the other Convention rights, it seems difficult to
resist the conclusion that it concerns itself predominantly with Mc-
Crudden's second meaning of equality.
The suspect classifications approach in the United States, on the
other hand, clearly addresses that part of the EPC that protects the
third meaning of equality, status harms. If a challenged distinction in
treatment does not attract the fundamental rights analysis (which
does not involve suspect classifications), nor effect a (political) status
harm, then only "equality as rationality" applies.' 84 It should strike
one as curious, therefore, to employ the status-harms-protective sus-
pect classification model to interpret Article 14, focused as it is pri-
marily on the "prized public goods" meaning of equality. According to
McCrudden, however, U.K. courts have tended, long before Carson, to
treat Article 14 as a status harms measure, probably owing to their
greater experience and comfort with the model served by domestic
statutory antidiscrimination laws.' 8 5 Strasbourg jurisprudence on
Article 14 has also, however, acknowledged some role for status harm
protection through its identification of grounds of discrimination that
require "weighty reasons" for justification. 8 6 This might tempt one
to argue that the Carson test does not defy Strasbourg precedent but
merely gives effect to the status harms aspect of Article 14. One
should resist this temptation.
The EPC analysis in the United States employs two alternative
threshold inquiries to determine whether scrutiny above the level of
rational basis review will apply. In order to serve the "prized public
goods" meaning of equality, an encroachment on a "fundamental
right" will engage heightened scrutiny.'8 7 The "status harms" mean-
ing receives heightened scrutiny protection only if the case satisfies
the "suspect classifications" threshold. Under Article 14 the expressly
predominant aim of guaranteeing the equal distribution of prized
public goods is protected by a similar "fundamental rights" threshold,
with a crucial difference: the relevant "fundamental rights" or "prized
public goods" are already clearly identified as all of the other rights
and freedoms in the Convention. If one accepts a rough analogy be-
tween proportionality and heightened scrutiny, at least in terms of
183. Id. at 620.
184. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789-806 (1983); The Forty-Second
Street Co. v. Koch, 613 F. Supp. 1416, 1985 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17750, 17-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372
(1971).
185. McCrudden, supra note 179, at 620.
186. Abdulaziz v. U.K. 94 (1985) EHRR 471, para. 78.
187. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).
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their function in their respective analyses, then under Article 14 the
heightened scrutiny of proportionality is triggered every time a case
is found to come within the "ambit" of another Convention right. In
other words, Article 14 already has a built-in threshold inquiry and
does not need another hurdle such as suspect classifications. The
Carson pastiche essentially subtracts from the "prized public goods"
protection expressly guaranteed by Article 14 and adds nothing to
Strasbourg's "weighty reasons" method of giving special protection
against status harms. Thus, requiring a suspect classification before
applying proportionality not only directly conflicts with recent Stras-
bourg authority,188 it erects a non sequitur hurdle associated with
one meaning of equality to deny protections clearly targeted at an-
other meaning.
V. CONCLUSION
It is easy to understand the attraction of a rule that claims to
distinguish presumptively valid discrimination from presumptively
invalid discrimination. Especially for judges who have generally con-
ceived of their role as involving only the interpretation and applica-
tion of the will of Parliament or the principles of the common law, the
prospect of applying what amounts to a form of heightened scrutiny
of parliamentary or executive action in every Article 14 case must
feel simultaneously like an appropriation of authority and an awful
lot of work. Surely, one can imagine them thinking, there must exist
a test that can weed out claims that common sense tells us have noth-
ing to do with the wrong that we think of as discrimination. However,
borrowing the concept of "suspect classifications"-and the three or
four levels of scrutiny that correspond to them-from U.S. Equal Pro-
tection Clause jurisprudence cannot solve this problem.
The most obvious reason for rejecting this "solution" lies in the
fact that Strasbourg authority already requires an approach inconsis-
tent with the suspect classifications model. ECtHR case law man-
dates that state actions imposing an unequal burden on the
enjoyment of convention rights, on a status ground covered by Article
14, satisfy the test of proportionality. It does not authorize, nor could
it logically, a bright line rule that declares certain kinds of discrimi-
nation proportionate so long as they are rational. Case law in Stras-
bourg and the United Kingdom makes it clear that "rational" and
"proportional" do not mean the same thing.18 9 For the United King-
dom to make some, indeed, most, of the grounds of discrimination
covered by Article 14 immune from the proportionality standard de-
fies both reason and its treaty obligations.
188. Paulik v. Slovakia [2006] ECHR 10699/05, paras. 54-58; Sidabras and
Dziautas v. Lithuania [2004] ECHR 395, paras. 51-61.
189. Daly, [2001] UKHL 26, paras. 26, 27, 32.
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Even if the ECHR permitted the United Kingdom to adopt a
short cut to avoid careful examination of "obviously reasonable" dis-
crimination, following the lead of the United States in this regard
makes no sense. The U.S. EPC emerged from a constitutional tradi-
tion in which only civil liberties, as opposed to human rights, receive
protection from state encroachment. Moreover, it emerged to deal
with discrimination against former African-American slaves after the
U.S. Civil War in the nineteenth century. It only began to apply be-
yond race and national origin in the 1970s, and then only to the ex-
tent that the kind of discrimination at issue resembled race
discrimination. 190 Therefore the suspect classifications doctrine
evolved to distinguish, on one hand, those kinds of discrimination
that encroach on political participation in the same way that race dis-
crimination does from, on the other, those that do not. The various
tiers of scrutiny applied in connection with differing degrees of "sus-
pectness" bear almost no relationship, in theory, to proportionality.
They exist to ensure that race discrimination will almost always vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, sex and illegiti-
macy discrimination will usually violate it, and other kinds of
discrimination almost never will. This kind of prejudgment of dis-
crimination cases has been so unpalatable even to the U.S. judiciary
that they have in practice begun to apply various improvised levels of
scrutiny, or to manipulate intermediate or rational basis scrutiny, in
order to approximate the kind of case-by-case balancing of interests
that proportionality provides for by its terms.
Article 14 shares neither the history of the EPC nor the rigidities
of its doctrine. It forms part of a human rights document concerned
with far more than political participation. It seeks to protect against
discrimination not only to ensure that minorities have equal access to
the political process but because it benefits European society to re-
spect the dignity of each human being, and treat them as an end in
themselves. It recognizes that, depending on the facts of each case,
discrimination on the basis of age, gender, or sexual orientation can
offend the dignity of an individual or a group as much as race dis-
crimination. Article 14 does not satisfy itself with prosecuting in-
stances of certain kinds of discriminatory wrongs but seeks instead to
protect people from having their enjoyment of Convention rights ren-
dered less valuable, on status grounds, without a reason so compel-
ling that it outweighs the injury to the individual and society. All of
these characteristics demonstrate that emulating the American EPC
approach not only departs from Strasbourg teaching but sells Article
14 and the ECHR short.
The truth is that the Strasbourg approach to discrimination, and
through the HRA the U.K. approach, has simply matured beyond the
190. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290.
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U.S. jurisprudence. While the United States prosecutes discrimina-
tory acts, Strasbourg protects against discriminatory effects. 191 The
United States struggles with ever more fragmented, pre-judged levels
of scrutiny for determining whether the state has done the best it
can, while the ECHR asks whether the state's action, regardless of
how well thought out and well-intentioned, imposes harms in terms
of individual or group dignity that outweigh the governmental bene-
fits it procures. The European approach represented by Article 14
recognizes the increasingly accepted fact that discrimination occurs
regardless of the state of mind of the "discriminator." It also deals
with the fact that judges cannot use "common sense" to determine
what kind of discrimination offends human dignity. Yesterday's com-
mon sense is today's sexual orientation or age discrimination. Propor-
tionality provides a court with the means to discover whether a law
that looks reasonable actually exacts too great a social cost in relation
to the advantages it promises. In hobbling this nuanced tool in favor
of an outmoded suspect classifications model, the Lords in Carson
made a retrograde step. If British judges can keep Carson an isolated
act of legal Luddism, then perhaps the United Kingdom can proceed
with the evolution of modern anti-discrimination law.
191. Kent Roach, Making Progress on Understanding and Remedying Racial Pro-filing, 41 ALBERTA L. REV 895, 896 (2004) ("emphasis on effects-based discrimina-
tion.., is a fundamental feature of modern understandings of equality rights, but it
is still not widely accepted in popular understandings of racism, which are often tied
to the idea of intentional discrimination").
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